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FAILURE TO LAUNCH:
How the Delinquent Politics and Policies of the
Texas Legislature Have Failed to Remedy Texas's
Antiquated Judicial System and How Voters Have
Accepted the Status Quo For Far Too Long
By:
Sandra Leigh King, J.D., LL.M.t
I.

INTRODUCTION

Several scholars, most notably judges, have called for judicial reform in the selection process of appellate and supreme court justices
in Texas. However, not much attention has been placed on the selection process of Texas trial court judges. This Article focuses on the
genealogy of district courts in Texas, with an emphasis on Texas's family court system, an area of the law that decides the fate of thousands
of children who, for the most part, are unable to speak for themselves
and that comprises a majority of civil cases within the state of Texas.1
As the majority of family court cases are decided by the trial court,
judicial review by an appellate or higher court is virtually non-existent.2 It is therefore necessary to have associate and district court
family judges who are educated and adequately staffed to handle the
multifarious complex issues involving children and families.
It is also vital that citizens better educate themselves about our judicial candidates and the judiciary in general until such time as the
t This Article is dedicated to Harrison Lee Chambers, who, at the tender age of
thirteen, constantly inspires the Author to seek justice for those whose voices are
often ignored with an inquisitive mind that continues to believe all things are possible
if one works hard, studies hard, and treats others with dignity and kindness. This
Article is also dedicated to Judge Charles Bleil and his entire staff including Carol
King Bowen and Becky Fitzhugh who have shown the Author the true meaning of
justice, compassion, and empathy.
1. See TEX. OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., DISTRICT COURTS AcTiviTY SUMMARY
BY CASE TYPE FROM JANUARY 1, 2006 TO JANUARY 31, 2009, at 2, http://www.dm.
courts.state.tx.us/oca/reportselection.aspx (choose "district court data reports" and
"district activity summary by case type"; then select "January 2006" through "January
2009") (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
2. Given that such a small percentage of family cases are appealed, our family
trial courts are the "court of last resort" for an overwhelming number of litigants in
the family court system in Texas and in family court systems across the country. For
example, in New York, 52% of all cases appealed resulted in the trial court's order or
judgment being affirmed, and 62% of all matrimonial cases were affirmed. Daniel
Clement, To Appeal or To Not to Appeal: Statistics, http://divorce.clementlaw.com/
2008/06/articles/divorce/to-appeal-or-to-not-to-appeal-statistics/ (June 5, 2008). In addition, in New York it was reported that as of 2007, 14% of the domestic relations
cases were reversed, and that at the end of the day, appellants only had a 25% chance
of either getting a reversal or modification of a matrimonial order or judgment. Id.
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Texas legislature gets serious and enacts fundamental change pertaining to the selection of state judges at all levels.
A.

Problem No. 1: Public Misunderstanding of the State Judiciary

As the result of various elements in pop culture including television,
film, mystery and suspense novels, cartoons, and ever-recurring cocktail party jokes, lawyers and the judiciary have a less-than-shiny reputation. The Texas Office of Court Administration (OCA) and the
State Bar of Texas conducted a study in 1998 that focused on issues
varying from the general trust and confidence in Texas's state courts
to the performance of Texas courts including fairness, representation,
strengths, and weaknesses of the Texas judicial system.3
According to the study, 84% of judges had positive overall impressions of Texas judges while only 55% of attorneys had a positive impression of judges. 4 "The groups who tended to have the most
negative overall impression of judges were local trial court judges, local trial court staff, and minority attorneys."' Given the high caseload
with which trial court judges must deal,6 it is not hard to imagine that
trial court judges and personnel would feel a bit discouraged under
our current rules and judicial structure.
In the family court system, the perceptions are further exacerbated
because "[c]ases involving the family have been labeled the 'stepchildren' of the justice system, due to the low level of importance many
courts and judges place on domestic issues."7 Family courts involve
people from all walks of life and all levels of education. Everyday
litigants who are already dealing with delicate and personal issues
often do not understand how the court system operates, nor do they
understand the overall culture of the judicial environment.
B.

Problem No. 2: The Stark Reality of Civil Appeals-So Few
Judges, So Many Cases, So Little Time

Most cases, including family court cases, are decided by lower court
judges' at the trial court level. 8 In 2006, 2007, and 2008, there were
3. TEX. OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN. & STATE BAR OF TEX., THE COURTS AND
THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN TEXAS-THE INSIDER'S PERSPECTIVE: A SURVEY OF
JUDGES, COURT PERSONNEL, AND ATTORNEYS (1998), http://www.courts.state.tx.us/
pubs/publictrust/execsum.htm.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See COMM. ON DIST. COURTS,

TEX. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ASSESSING JUDICIAL
WORKLOAD IN TEXAS' DISTRICT COURTS 14, http://www.courts.state.tx.us/tjc/TJC-

Reports/FinalReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
7. Erin J. May, Social Reform for Kentucky's Judicial System: The Creation of
Unified Family Courts, 92 Ky. L.J. 571, 571 (2004).
8. See TEX. OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., supra note 1, at 2.
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6,099 reported divorces and annulments in Texas.9 Family court cases
are of particular importance because of the intimate nature of the circumstances and subject of the lawsuit-minor children. The average
duration of first marriages is seven to eight years,10 and during this
time that relationship will most likely produce a child, and that child

will be under the jurisdiction of the Texas family court system for
somewhere between eleven to eighteen years.11

At the district court (trial court) level, of the approximate 450,000
civil cases that were filed, more than half of the civil cases brought in
2007 were family law cases. 12 Of these civil cases, divorce cases constituted 26% . Motions to modify an existing parent-child agreement
fell into a category that included all other family law matters such as
annulments, adoptions, name changes, and termination of parental
4
rights. This category comprised 27% of civil cases filed that year.'

In Texas, since 1998, civil filings have hovered around 500,000 per

year. 1 5 Very few of these cases are ever appealed after trial court disposition.16 In fact, of the approximate 450,000 civil cases filed in 2007,
as of August 31, 2007, only 8,744 were pending review on appellate
dockets across the state.' 7 Of course, a case filed in 2007 would not
usually be appealed the same year.' 8 However, even if the case was
originally filed in 2006 or before, the disparity between the hundreds

of thousands of cases filed versus the number pending on appeal is
extremely wide.' 9

9. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Births, Marriages, Divorces, and
Deaths: ProvisionalDatafor 2008, 57 NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP. No. 19, 5, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/NCHS/data/nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57-19.pdf.
10. The average duration of first marriages that end in divorce for men is 7.8
years; for women, it is 7.9 years. DIVORCE MAGAZINE, U.S. DIVORCE STATISTICS
(2002), http://divorcemag.com/statistics/statsUS2002.shtml.
11. See Stephanie J. Ventura, et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Estimated Pregnancy Rates for the United States 1990-2005: An Update, 58 NAT'L VITAL
STAT. REPS. No. 4, at 2, 13 (2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/
nvsr58/nvsr58 04.pdf. Eleven years would mean that the child was born at the end of
the marriage. Eighteen years would mean that the child was born at the beginning of
the marriage.
12. TEX. OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., DISTRICT COURTS ACTIVITY SUMMARY BY
CASE TYPE FROM JANUARY 1, 2007 TO DECEMBER 31, 2007, at 2, http://www.dm.
courts.state.tx.us/oca/reportselection.aspx (choose "district court data reports" and
"district activity summary by case type"; then select "January 2007" through "December 2007") (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id.; OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., ACTIVITY FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED
AUGUST 31, 2007, at 4 (2007), http://www.courts.state.tx.us/pubs/AR2007/coas/4activity-detail-2007.xls.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See TEX. OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., supra note 1.
19. Id.
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In Texas, of the 3,426 civil cases appealed as of August 31, 2007,
1,413 were affirmed by the appellate court,2° which computes to an

affirmation rate of 41.24%; 532 cases were reversed,21 computing to a
reversal rate of 15.58%.22 But family law is different. Unlike general

civil cases, in Texas "[f]amily law appeals meet with more success than
one might suspect, 2 3 with an overall reversal rate of 32%,24 almost
twice the overall reversal rate for civil trials in Texas. Given the great

deference provided to trial judges and the higher than usual reversal
rates, one is forced to examine whether judicial discretion is either
abused or flat out blind.

The numbers for family court appeals in Texas are a bit skewed because so few litigants ever appeal family court decisions.26 While

"[f]amily cases form the largest group of civil cases filed, few of them
are tried. Even fewer are appealed.... 27 Thus, the trial court is the
court of last resort, and usually the associate judge is the judge of last

resort before the presiding district court judge has an opportunity to
review the case.28
In Texas civil trials, and especially in the Texas family court system,
"[t]rial judges enjoy largely unfettered discretion in decisions relating
to the conduct of trials.

'29

Trial judges' control over the trial begins

before the jury is even selected. The presiding judge rules on countless objections, controls the manner and timing of how attorneys se-

lect jurors, the duration of witness testimony, and the general tenor of
the entire trial such as when trial breaks are held and when jurors are
allowed to go home for the evening.30
At a seminar at Baylor Law School in 2006, at least one judge stated

that he tries to limit temporary hearings to half a day. 31 This particular judge, Judge Strother, stated that he did not want to hear the same
20. Id. (showing that 41.24% of total trial court decisions were upheld).
21. Id. (showing that 15.58% of total trial court decisions were reversed).
22. Clement, supra note 2.
23. Lynne Liberato & Kent Rutter, Evaluating Appeals by the Numbers, 66 TEX.
B.J. 768, 772 (2003).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 772-73 ("Broken down by type, the figures show that in divorce cases,
including actions to enforce or modify existing decrees, the reversal rate was 24 percent. In suits to modify the parent-child relationship, the reversal rate was 34 percent.
In child support cases, including actions to collect child support or modify a child
support obligation, the reversal rate was 42 percent.").
26. Id. at 773 (Some have argued that "[t]he high reversal rate [of family law
cases] may be connected to the low number of appeals in family cases.") (emphasis
added).
27. Id.
28. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and
Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 101 (1997) ("State trial
courts are the venue where most legal disputes both begin and end.").
29. Id. at 145.
30. Id.
31. Kevin Priestner, Kids in the Crossfire: Family Law Section Offers Free Pro
Bono Training, 69 TEX. B.J. 436, 436-37 (2006).
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thing corroborated32 by ten different witnesses and that he mostly
"played it by ear." Another judge, Judge Meyer, stated that he "relies on a stopwatch."3 3 A third judge, Judge Mayfield, stated that he is
a fan of using timers.3 4 Judge Mayfield stated that he uses a double
timer, but only on certain cases and only with certain lawyers. 35 Thus,
trial judges hold incredible power to set the tenor for the trial from
day one until its conclusion.
In the family court context, the power of judicial discretion is of
particular importance because our family court judges decide the fates
of those who cannot speak for themselves-our children. 36 Family
court judges decide everything from visitation schedules, to monthly
child support, to an infinite number of issues that are unique to each
case involving a minor child.
However, according to a study released in June 2008 from the National Center for State Courts, the average time spent by judges to
decide a divorce is 47 minutes.37 The average time spent on a parentchild modification or enforcement of an order is a mere 33 minutes.3 8
Judges and court personnel in the family court system have blamed
the backlog of cases as a major weakness in the judicial system. 39 Perhaps this backlog, at no surprise, is part of the reason that family court
cases are dispensed of in such quick fashion.4 °
However, when one considers the average duration of first and second marriages and the likelihood that children are born into these
marriages, even in the best of circumstances these children would still
be under the jurisdiction of a family court that decides at least one
decade of the children's lives. It would be prudent to spend more
than approximately half an hour to three quarters of an hour to decide
what will happen to these children's lives until these children reach
the age of majority. 4 1 These fast-paced decisions often ignore children
who have special needs or the quality of the child's life that he or she
32. Id. at 437 ("I don't want to hear the same thing corroborated by 10 different
witnesses .... Mostly, I play it by ear. When I've heard enough, I let them know.").
33. Id. ("I give them 50 or 60 minutes .... Some lawyers have problems running
up against the clock. I also use a stopwatch for voir dire.").
34. Id.
It cost me $19 and is the best investment I've
35. Id. ("I use a double timer ....
made. But I don't use it on every lawyer, nor do I use it on every case.").
36. See Lance A. Cooper, An Historical Overview of Judicial Selection in Texas, 2
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 317, 327-28 (1995).
37. BRIAN J. OSTSROM, MATTHEW KLEIMAN & NEIL LAFOUNTAIN, THE NAT'L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, MEASURING CURRENT JUDICIAL WORKLOAD IN TEXAS,

2007, at 8 (2008); available at http://www.courts.state.tx.us/oca/jnas/pdf/Weighted
CaseloadStudy.pdf.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (showing that Judges cited backlog as their primary concern, followed by
judicial selection. The order was reversed among attorneys).
41. In the best case scenario, the average time spent on other family law matters is
about three quarters of an hour. Id.
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enjoyed prior to the divorce as opposed to after the divorce when the
managing conservator's (usually the mother) standard of living has decreased.4 2 Further, because so many litigants in family court represent
themselves pro se, the gavel of the trial judge wields power that is
even greater than if these parties were represented by counsel. To
these litigants who represent
themselves, the trial court truly is their
"court of last resort."4 3 Appeals are difficult enough for parties that
were represented at the trial court level by even the best of counsel.
However, when one is pro se and does not adequately preserve the
trial record, an appeal is all but impossible, even excluding the financial costs.' More importantly, in the family court system the emotional and psychological costs are born by litigants and their minor
children.4 5
II.

HISTORY OF TEXAS COURTS-A LOOK BACK AT THE
FOUNDATIONS OF OUR CURRENT CONSTITUTION

In Texas, many citizens are under the false impression that "the
ability to elect a judiciary is a 'birthright' of Texas citizens." 4 6 This
47
conveys an unfortunate "basic misunderstanding of Texas history"
that is important for citizens to understand, because if we do not understand our history, then we will not be able to make informed and
intelligent choices about where to proceed in the future. Further complicating Texan's misconceptions about our state judiciary are the multiple articles written by legal scholars that have stated that our present
system, in which judges are selected in popular elections, began in
1876 with the adoption of the current Texas Constitution.4 8 The 1876
Constitution called for electing state judges at all levels; however,
Texas actually had other periods of time where certain types of judges
42. See BOB LEONARD LAW GROUP, TEXAS FAMILY LAW FAQs: WHY SHOULD I
PAY ALL OF THIS CHILD SUPPORT, WHEN SHE JUST SPENDS IT ON HERSELF?, http://
www.bobleonard.com/FAQs/Family-Law-FAQ/#why-pay-child support (last visited
Sept. 7, 2009) ("Studies have shown that in the typical arrangement where mom has
custody and dad pays child support, mom's standard of living goes down after the
divorce and dad's goes up.").
43. See CAROLE BELL FORD, THE WOMEN OF COURT WATCH: REFORMING A
CORRUPT FAMILY COURT SYSTEM 169 (2005).
44. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 (showing how many steps are necessary at trial court
level to preserve any issue for appeal).
45. See Bruce C. Zivley, Divorce FAQs: Who Will Win Custody of the Children?,
http://www.brucezivley.com/CM/CustomfDivorce-FAQs.asp?ss=faq-wrap-single-ques
tions.xsl#05 (last visited Dec. 29, 2009).
46. John L. Hill, Jr., Taking Texas Judges out of Politics: An Argument for Merit
Election, 40 BAYLOR L. REv. 339, 344 (1988).
47.

Id.

48. See, e.g., Charles Bleil, Comment, Can a Twenty-First Century Texas Tolerate
its Nineteenth Century Judicial Selection Process?, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1089, 1090
(1995); Hill, supra note 46, at 347.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol16/iss3/3
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V16.I3.2

6

King: Failure to Launch: How the Delinquent Politics and Policies of th

FAILURE TO LAUNCH

2010]

were elected by either the legislature, the general public eligible to
vote, or by a combination of both systems.49
For decades, Texas flip-flopped back and forth between a system of
appointment, elections by the legislature, and eventually elections by
the general public.5" The significant changes to the Constitution were
made in reaction to various civic and political crises.5 1 Thus, our 1876
Constitution was not so much a radical departure from the status quo,
but rather was based on reactions to decades of cultural strife and the
fact that Texas is the only state in our Union that was its own sovereign nation.5 2 The history of our present-day Constitution is best understood when one looks at who our founding fathers were and their
ancestors. One should keep in mind that these were individuals who
were brave, but flawed, who lived in the wilderness fighting not only
Indian tribes but Mexico, and also their own American brothers during the Civil War.5 3 The following sections explain who Texans are,
where Texans have been, and why "Texas is a whole other country"
and truly is unique in the nation.5 4 The following sections also discuss
the reactionary provisions made to our state's Constitution in times of
crisis.
A.

Texas: Colonization and The Early Pre-Republic Years

The early years of Texas were chaotic to say the least. In addition to
briefly being its own sovereign, Texas was a frontier republic whose
leaders and settlers were at war with the Comanche Indian tribe and
Mexicans who gradually saw Texans (or Texians as they were called at
the time) slipping away from their control.5 5 From time to time,
Texas's constitutional delegates struggled with not only the problems
of dealing with Mexico, but secession, and also framing and re-framing a state government over and over for more than fifty years.
49. Hill, supra note 46, at 346.
50. Id.
51. LONE STAR JUNCTION, TEXAS HISTORY TIMELINE: KEY EVENTS IN EARLY
TEXAS (Lyman Hardeman ed.), http://lsjunction.com/events/events.htm (last visited
Sept. 7, 2009) (providing a general timeline of major events in Texas's history).
52. Id.
53. The Author is a daughter of Goliad, the Alamo, and the Civil War on her
mother's side of the family.
54. See Barry Popik, "Texas: It's Like a Whole Other Country," http://www.barry
popik.com/index.php/texas/entry/texas-its like a wholeothercountry/ (Aug. 10,
2006). For example, in addition to the idiosyncrasies that are commonplace to native
Texas and foreign to outsiders, "Texas was the first jurisdiction to merge law and
equity, the first to adopt a homestead exemption law, and a pioneer in community
property law." James W. Paulsen, Remember the Alamo[ny]! The Unique Texas Ban
on PermanentAlimony and the Development of Community Property Law, 56 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 9 (1993). Thus, not only has Texas been a pioneer in petrochemicals, aerospace, and cancer research, but Texas lawmakers and judges have historically "found themselves in the position of legal innovators." Id.
55. Paulsen, supra note 54, at 8-9.
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On January 3, 1823, the Mexican government granted Stephen F.
Austin permission to begin colonization near the Brazos River in what
is now central Texas.56 After colonization began, a Constitution was
enacted in 1824 that gave Mexico a republican form of government of

which Texas was a part.5 7

All judges under the 1824 Constitution were appointed.58 For judiciary matters, the requirements were fairly simple. One had to be a
citizen of the Union (the Mexican Republic) and be a mere twenty59
five years or thirty years of age, depending on the judicial position.
Circuit judges were also appointed and had a thirty-year-age requirement as well as maintain citizenship status. 60 These circuit judges re-

present modern-day district judges in that they were designated to
handle controversies that exceeded $500.61 There were also district
court judges who were disallowed to hear cases where the amount in
controversy exceeded $500.62 The age requirement for these judges
was a bit less, only twenty-five years.6 3 The Texas Supreme Court
would name the three candidates whom the president would ap-

point.6 4 These district court judges represent our modern-day county
court judges in that they were limited to cases and controversies
where $500 or less was in dispute.65 Thus, judges were appointed, but
there were recommendations at least at the highest state court level,
56. LONE STAR JUNCTION, supra note 51; see also RANDOLPH
GONE TO TEXAS 105 (2003).
57. FEDERAL CONST. OF THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES of 1824,

B.

CAMPBELL,

tit. II, arts. 4-5,
reprinted in 1 H.P.N. Gammel, the Laws of Texas 1822-1897, at 73 (Austin, Gammel
Book Co. 1898), available at http://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth5872/ml/
81/.
58. Id. tit. V, § 6, art. 144 (designating the appointment of District Judges); Id. § 5,
art. 140 (designating the appointment of Circuit Judges).
59. Id. tit. V, § 6, art. 144, Gammel at 90 ("To be a judge of the district court, it is
necessary to be a citizen of the Union, and twenty-five years of age [and that the
president would appoint] these judges from three candidates named by the supreme
court.").
60. Id. § 5, art. 141. Further, there was a requirement that "[t]he circuit court of a
judge [must be] skilled in law and a fiscal, both named by the supreme executive
power from three candidates, designated by the supreme court, and of two associates,
according to law." Id. art. 140. The requirements of citizenship and being at least
thirty years of age were also in force. Id. art. 141.
61. Compare id. art. 141, and TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1, with TEX. Gov'T CODE
ANN. §§ 24-27 (Vernon 2004) (establishing Section 24 of the Texas Government
Code, which describes district court jurisdiction; Section 25 of the Texas Government
Code, which describes county courts at law; Section 26 of the Texas Government
Code, which describes the jurisdiction of constitutional county courts; and Section 27
of the Texas Government Code, which describes justice courts).
62. FEDERAL CONST. OF THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES of 1824, tit. V, § 6, art.
143, Gammel at 90.
63. Id. art. 144.
64. Id. § 5, art. 140. The use of the word "designated" is the equivalent of "appointed," and the use of the word "named" is essentially the equivalent of a strong
recommendation of allowing the names who are named to be approved.
65. Id. § 6, art. 143.
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and categories of judges and limitations on the types of cases and controversies were established.6 6
Between 1824 and 1827, things appeared to be working smoothly in
the new Texas territory, on paper at least; but that was soon about to
change, especially in what is now south central Texas. A dark period
of history that involved a bitter revolution was about to begin. During
1827, Texas was still part of Mexico, and a new constitution was enacted.67 Under the 1827 Constitution, like the 1824 version, judges
were again appointed.6 8
Changes to the judiciary included a provision for a supreme court
that would be divided into three halls with at least one magistrate in
each of the three halls and a fiscal who would organize the halls.6 9
This system was similar to our modern day court clerk system of case
organization and scheduling and the federal Supreme Court where the
Chief Justice assigns cases.70 In 1833, Texas delegates made significant
changes regarding the state judiciary. Instead of being appointed,
judges were to be elected by the state legislature. 7 ' It is important to
note that the judges were elected by members of the legislature-not
by the voting public at large.7 2 There was also a provision for judges
to be removed by an impeachment process very similar to impeachment in the modern-day federal system.73 However, the 1833 Consti66. See generally id. §§ 5-6.
67. See STATE OF COAHUILA AND TEX. CONST. of 1827, reprinted in 1 H.P.N.
Gammel, the Laws of Texas 1822-1897, at 423 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898),
available at http://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth5872/ml/431/.
68. Id. tit. III, art. 201, Gammel at 450 ("Both magistrates and fiscal shall be appointed by congress on nomination by the executive. They shall receive a competent
salary, to be designated by law, and cannot be removed from office, except from a
legally established cause.").
69. Id. art. 194, Gammel at 449 ("In the capital of the state there shall be a supreme tribunal divided into three halls, each composed of the magistrate or magistrates whom the law designated, and said tribunal shall have a fiscal, who shall
despatch [sic] all the subjects of the three halls. Should the hall consist of one minister only, said special law shall determine whether colleagues should be appointed, and
the manner and form it shall be done.").
70. Further provisions in the 1827 Constitution included a "special law" that determined whether colleagues (i.e., justices and other members of the court) should be
appointed, and the manner and form for said appointments. Id.
71. CONSTITUTION OR FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF TEXAS of 1833,
art. 77, available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/text/cah3gp.htm
("The
judicial power shall be vested in a supreme court, and inferior courts."); Id. art. 78
("The State of Texas shall be divided into four judicial districts, in each of which there
shall be appointed a district judge."); Id. art. 79 ("The said district judges shall compose the supreme court .... ); Id. art. 81 ("The judges of the district and supreme
courts, who shall be elected at the first session of the legislature, shall hold their offices
for the term of three years, eligible for re-election; and their successors in office shall
hold their office for the term of six years, eligible to re-election by the legislature every
six years.") (emphasis added).
72. Id. art. 81.
73. Id. art. 86 ("The judges may be removed from office by a concurrent vote of
both houses of the legislature: but two-thirds of the number present, must concur in
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tution did not last for long. Texans were gradually seeking more and

more independence from Mexico, and this desire for independence
from Mexico erupted in a bitter and lengthy revolution that began in
1835. 74

B.

Texas Independence and Statehood

In 1836, Texas declared itself independent precipitating a dark revolutionary period that involved battlefields such as Goliad (1836), the
Battle of the Alamo (1836), and a decisive battle for Texas at the Battle of San Jacinto (1836).

75

After declaring independence, Texians,

who were about to become "Texans," enacted the 1836 Constitution
of the Republic of Texas.7 6 The 1836 Constitution for the new Republic revised the fixed number of four judicial districts to a number between three and eight.77

Unlike when Texas was part of Mexico, judges were to be elected,
not appointed,7 8 a further reactionary move away from Mexican control. With the 1836 Constitution, though, voting again was by members of the legislature, not the voting public at large.7 9 In the 1836

Constitution, judicial power was vested in a supreme court and inferior courts of which the justices would serve four-year terms and then
were subject to re-election. 80 However, this was not an election by the
general public eligible to vote; rather, these supreme and district court
judges would be elected by joint ballot of both houses of the state
legislature.8 1 Inferior county courts were also established in each

such vote, and the causes of removal shall be entered on the journal of each. The
judge against whom the legislature may be about to proceed, shall receive notice
thereof, accompanied by a copy of the causes alleged for his removal, at least thirty
days before the day on which either house of the legislature shall sit thereupon."); Id.
art. 87 ("The judges may also be removed by impeachment."); Id. art. 88 ("The power
of impeachment shall be vested in the house of representatives."); Id. art. 89 ("All
impeachments shall be tried by the Senate: when acting for that purpose, the members shall be upon oath, and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of
two-thirds of the members present.").
74. LONE STAR JUNCTION, supra note 51.
75. Campbell, supra note 56, at 140-47.
76. REPUB.TEX. CONST. of 1836, reprinted in 1 H.P.N. Gammel, the Laws of Texas
1822-1897, at 1069 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898), available at http://texashistory.
unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth5872/ml/1077/; see THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
MADE BY THE DELEGATES OF THE PEOPLE OF TEXAS, reprinted in 1 H.P.N. Gammel,
the Laws of Texas 1822-1897, at 1063 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898), available at
http://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth5872/ml/1071/.
77. REPUB. TEX. CONST. of 1836, art. IV, § 2, Gammel at 1073.
78. Id. § 9, Gammel at 1074.
79. Id. ("The judges of the supreme and district courts shall be elected by joint
ballot of both Houses of Congress.").
80. Id. § 1, Gammel at 1073.
81. Id. § 9, Gammel at 1074.
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county with county judges and justices of the peace who were appointed by the president of Texas.82

On December 29, 1845, Texas joined the United States becoming

the twenty-eighth state admitted to the Union.8 3 During this time, un-

like every other state that entered the Union, Texas provided for judicial elections.'

"When Texas became a state, its constitution called

for the appointment of [Supreme Court] judges by the governor, with

the concurrence of the Senate."8 5 However, upon closer examination
of the 1845 Constitution, that is not the full story of the judiciary.

There is much more to the 1845 Constitution than appointing justices
to the supreme court. In fact, the 1845 Constitution included major

changes to the judiciary such as the power to issue writs of habeas

corpus vested in the Supreme Court86 and also writs of mandamus,87
along with other important procedures concerning lower court judges.

While supreme court judges were to be appointed by the governor

and approved by the senate, 88 Texas was again divided into districts
with each district having an appointed, presiding judge. 89 A procedure for removal of these appointed district judges was stated, again

similar to previous removal provisions in prior Texas Constitutions
and similar to our current federal system. 9°

One of the most significant changes, though, is that for the first time
eligible (or "qualified") voters determined county judges and justices

of the peace. 9 ' This is extremely significant because it is the first instance in Texas's constitutional history where eligible (or "qualified")
82. Id. § 12; Cooper, supra note 36, at 322-23. As an aside note, in 1839, Austin
became the capital of the Republic of Texas. LONE STAR JUNCTION, supra note 51.
83. See TEX. CONST. of 1845, available at http://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/
metapth6726/ml/1281/.
84. Cooper, supra note 36, at 324.
85. Id.

86. TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. IV, § 3, available at http://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/
67531/metapth6726/ml/1289/.
87. Id.

88. Id. § 5 ("The governor shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent
of two-thirds of the Senate, shall appoint the judges of the supreme and district
courts, and they shall hold their offices for six years.").
89. Id. § 6 ("The State shall be divided into convenient judicial districts. For each
district there shall be appointed a judge, who shall reside in the same, and hold the
courts at one place in each county, and at least twice in each year, in such manner as
may be prescribed by law.").
90. Id. § 8 ("The judges of the supreme and district courts shall be removed by the
governor, on the address of two-thirds of each house of the legislature, for wilful [sic]
neglect of duty, or other reasonable cause, which shall not be sufficient ground for
impeachment . .

").

91. Id. § 13 ("There shall be appointed for each county a convenient number of
justices of the peace, one sheriff, one coroner, and a sufficient number of constables,
who shall hold their offices for two years to be elected by the qualified voters of the
districtor county as the legislature may direct. Justices of the peace, sheriffs, and coroners, shall be commissioned by the governor. The sheriff shall not be eligible more

than four years in every six.") (emphasis added).
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voters played a direct role in determining who served on at least some
of our courts. 92
C. The Mexican-American War (1846-1848), 1850 Constitutional
Amendments, and Secession from the Union (1861)
In 1846, new problems faced the fledgling new state of Texas. The
Mexican-American War began, and Texas's state border (and a significant portion of the border between the United States and Mexico)
was fixed at the Rio Grande River.93 The war was a "defining event
for both nations [Mexico and the United States], transforming a continent and forging a new identity for its peoples. By the war's end in
1848, under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mexico lost nearly half
of its territory, the present American Southwest from Texas to California, and the United States became a continental power."9 4

In 1850, two years after the Treaty of Hidalgo was signed, judicial
elections became partisan, following the lead of New York, a most
unlikely predecessor.95 Amendments were made to Texas's 1845 State
Constitution that provided that district judges were to be elected by
eligible voters within their respective districts.96 Another 1850
amendment provided that justices of the peace were to be appointed,
and after their two-year term was over, the justices would be subject
to re-election by qualified voters of the district or county. 97 Again,
though, justices of the peace were to be appointed. 98
Eleven years later, the 1861 Convention that ultimately led to
Texas's secession from the Union began on January 28, 1861. 9 9 Days
later, on February 2, 1861, Texas's fate concerning secession was

92. Compare id., and REPUB. TEX. CONST. of 1836, art. IV, §§ 2-12, reprinted in 1
H.P.N. Gammel, the Laws of Texas 1822-1897, at 1073-74 (Austin, Gammel Book Co.
1898), with FEDERAL CONST. OF THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES of 1824, tit. II, arts.
4-5, Gammell at 90.
93. See EUGENE C. BARKER ET AL., A SCHOOL HISTORY OF TEXAS 192-93
(1912).
94. PBS, THE U.S.-MEXICAN WAR (1846-1848), http://www.pbs.org/kera/usmexi
canwar/war (last visited Sept. 6, 2009).
95. Hill, supra note 46, at 346-47 (citations omitted).
96. TEX. CONST. of 1861, art. IV, at § 2, available at http://texashistory.unt.edu/
ark:/67531/metapth6727/ml/27/.
97. Id. at § 5.
98. Id. at § 13 ("There shall be appointed for each county a convenient number of
Justices of the Peace, one Sheriff, one Coroner, and a sufficient number of Constables, who shall hold their offices for two years, to be elected by the qualified voters of
the district or county, as the Legislature may direct.").
99. JOURNAL OF THE SECESSION CONVENTION OF TEXAS 1861, at 9 (Ernest William Winkler, ed., 1912), available at http://tarIton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/pdf/
pdfl861/January% 2028,%201861.pdf.
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sealed.1 °° Much debate has been proposed concerning the reason(s)
why Texas made the decision to secede.' 1
The 1861 Convention Journal provides much insight into this discussion. The delegates, led by President 0. M. Roberts, a staunch Confederate, declared that "[t]hey [the Federal Government] have
proclaimed, and at the ballot box sustained, the revolutionary doctrine
that there is a 'higher law' than the constitution and laws of our Federal Union, and virtually that they will disregard their oaths and trample upon our rights."'0 2 This laid the footwork for what was 10 to
3
become the 1866 Constitution and later, the present Constitution.
These same delegates of minority opinions sent a second important
letter on March 14, 1861, to the President of the Convention, General
0. M. Roberts. In the letter, James W. Throckmorton, William H.
Stewart, and Elijah Sterling Clark stated they felt that "[f]ifty years
hence the population of this great State will have increased to millions, and notwithstanding such vast increase in the population as we
know will take place, yet the school fund will have so increased, and
even long before the period alluded to, that not only the indigent orphan children can be educated by the State, but every child of Texas,
of however exalted or humble
parentage, can be most munificently
0 4
cared for and educated.'
The 1861 Constitution of the State of Texas represents something
between either chaos because of secession from the Union or a more
underlying current that seems to reflect Texas and Texans in generalthe desire for autonomy that is an undercurrent in even modern-day
literature and pop culture. 0 5
The 1861 secession convention resulted in Texas joining the Confederacy and created the 1861 Constitution that returned selection of all
state judges to an appointment system by the state governor with confirmation by the Senate. 10 6 This was the first time in thirty-four years
(since the 1827 Constitution when Texas was still part of Mexico)
where judges at all levels were again appointed, including district
100. See id. at 61-66. "The controlling majority of the Federal Government, under
various pretences (spelling in original) and disguises, has so administered the same as
to exclude the citizens of the Southern States, unless under odious and unconstitutional restrictions, from all the immense territory owned in common by all the States
on the Pacific Ocean, for the avowed purpose of acquiring sufficient power in the
common government to use it as a means of destroying the institutions of Texas and
her sister slave-holding States." Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
101. See generally id.
102. Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
103. See generally Mary M. Brown, A Condensed History of Texas for Schools
200-05 (Dallas, J.J. Little & Co., 1895).
104. JOURNAL OF THE SECESSION CONVENTION OF TEXAS 1861, supra note 99, at
162.
105. See generally TEX. CONST. of 1861, available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/
constitutions/text/1861index.html.
106. Hill, supra note 46, at 347.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

13

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 16 [2022], Iss. 3, Art. 3

[Vol. 16

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

court judges who had been elected by qualified (eligible) voters as of

the 1850 amendments, and the 1845 Constitution where justices of the
peace and county judges were elected by eligible, qualified voters of
the general public. 10 7 Thus, Texas's secession from the Union caused
Texas to depart from the pattern of judicial elections across the Union
that was in place in 1846.108
This was also a departure from amendments that were made in 1850

that called for Texas Supreme Court justices and district court judges
to be elected by qualified electors in Texas in the event of a vacancy."°9 The 1850 amendments ° stated that within each district
would be an elected judge."'
D.

The Civil War (1861-1865), Reconstruction, and the Immediate
Years Prior to Texas's Current State Constitution (1876)

During the Civil War (1861-1865), judges "had to preside at a time
in which governmental authority was, at first, largely handed over to
military authorities, and later, totally disappeared.""'

2

Later, as

shown below, "[d]uring Reconstruction, a judge was subject to removal by the occupying forces of the United States government any
time a ruling disappointed the commanding general, or one of his
friends.""' 3 This military "occupation" led to fear of northern control
of the South and was likely one of the primary reasons that Texas has
elected state judges at all state levels.
After the Union won the war, healing was not only necessary between the North and the South, but also between west and east Texas.
In 1866, in the wake of the Civil War, amid fear of being controlled by
the federal government and repercussions from seceding in 1861, car107. See TEX. CONST. of 1861, art. IV, § 5, available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/

constitutions/text/EART04.html ("The Governor shall nominate, and by and with the
advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, shall appoint the Judges of the Supreme and District Courts and they shall hold their offices for six years."). Texas
Supreme Court judges were still appointed at this time.
108. Cooper, supra note 36, at 326.
109. TEX. CONST. of 1861, art. IV, § 1, available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/
constitutions/text/EART04.html ("The Judges of the Supreme Court, Judges of the
District Courts ... shall, at the expiration of their respective terms of office, or in a
case a vacancy may occur in either of them, by death, resignation, or otherwise, after
this amendment takes effect, and thereafter, be elected by the qualified electors of the
State, in the manner prescribed by law.").
110. Id. There was also a minor amendment made in 1856 that merely adjusted
judicial salaries of Supreme Court Justices and District Court Judges. No other substantial changes were made in 1856. Id.
111. Id. § 6 ("The state shall be divided into convenient judicial districts. For each
district, there shall be elected a Judge who shall reside in the same, and hold the
courts at one place in each county, and at least twice in each year, in such manner as
may be prescribed by law.").
112. Mark Davidson, A Look Back at the Era of Uniform JudicialRulings in Harris
County, Hous. LAW, Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 16, 16.
113. Id.
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petbaggers, who were businessmen from the North, quickly headed
South during the early days of Reconstruction (1865-1877).114 Most
agree that these carpetbaggers, who got their name from the type of
luggage they used, were, for the most part, scoundrels who sought to
make quick profits as quickly as possible and then head back home to
the North." 5 Distrust of the North was not only felt in the 1866 Convention, but also lingered116a decade later into the 1875 Convention for
our present constitution.
From the Journals of the 1866 Constitutional Convention it is clear
that tensions still abounded between those who supported secession
during the war and the newly appointed provisional Governor of
Texas, Andrew Jackson Hamilton, who was, for the most part, a
Union loyalist. 117 Early in his career, Governor Hamilton was a member of the "Opposition Clique," a group of Texas Democrats who opposed secession.' 18 He also was appointed as Provisional Governor of
Texas by President Andrew Johnson in 1865.119 Later, he fled the
State of Texas because of numerous death threats and did not return
to Texas until the summer1 20of 1865, shortly before the Convention began the following winter.
In 1866, Governor Hamilton rose to his greatest fame as a delegate
to the Constitutional Convention in 1866 and as provisional governor,
having been appointed by President Lincoln in 1865.121 One can
hardly imagine the fear and trepidation that Governor Hamilton was
under when he addressed the Convention. Governor Hamilton was
walking a very tight line between his personal convictions concerning
abolition and his fear of other delegates whom
might have made
122
threats against him or knew others who had.
Governor Hamilton, who had a well-documented reputation of being a proponent of freed slaves' rights, by his own words during the
address at the Convention in 1866, questioned his own reported repu114. See Dudley G. Wooten, A Complete History of Texas: for Schools, Colleges,
and General Use 376 (Dallas, The Tex. History Co. 1899).
115. See BARKER, supra note 93, at 229.
116. See generally Brown, supra note 103.
117. See generally JOURNALS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF TEXAS
1866, available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/pdf/pdf1866/index866.
html.
118. Telegram from Andrew Johnson, President, United States, to A.J. Hamilton,
Governor, Tex. (Feb. 13, 1866), available at http://www.tsl.state.tx.us/governors/war/
hamilton-johnson-l.html.
119. D.W.C. BAKER, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TEXAS: FROM ITS EARLIEST SETrLEMENT 126-27 (N.Y., A.S. Barnes & Co. 1873).
120. Hamilton, Andrew Jackson (1815-1875), in INFOPLEASE, http://www.info
please.com/biography/us/congress/hamilton-andrew-jackson.html
(last visited Sept.
22, 2009).
121. Id.; see also Telegram from Andrew Johnson, supra note 118.
122. See generally INFOPLEASE, supra note 120; Telegram from Andrew Johnson,
supra note 118.
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tation by contradictory statements. 23 Governor Hamilton first stated
that eligible voters should only include individuals who swore an oath

of loyalty to the United States, and these eligible citizens were not just
eligible voters, but eligible delegates to the convention as well.' 24 Of
course, this proclamation makes some sense politically. Later, however, Governor Hamilton made remarks about his desire25 for the reconciled Union to remain a "white man's government."'
Remarks like this demonstrate the undercurrents that were swirling
during the 1866 Convention, and these undercurrents were comprised
of significant unresolved tension, anger, depression, and resentment
about a war among brothers and families who were destroyed. One
delegate, E. Degener, stated, "These people [slaves] were called upon
to defend with their lives the integrity of the Union, and thousands of
them are still under arms, ready to perish in defence [sic] of their native land; and they are now everywhere clamoring for the right of suffrage."' 2 6 These remarks were made to a majority of members of the
Convention who, while they wanted equality and voting of officials
and judges, still wanted only white males to be eligible to vote. 2 7
Hamilton, however, was fierce in his stance on black suffrage, but he

still wanted a purely white, male-only government. 128 The result was1 29a
system where all state judges are elected, as well as the governor.

Thus, one gets the sense of a general mistrust that the federal government might try to exercise30too much control in exchange for an "oath
of loyalty" to the Union.'

123. See JOURNALS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF TEXAS 1866, supra
note 117, at 25.
124. Id. at 16.
125. Id. at 25.
126. Id. at 90.
.127. See id.
128. Id.; "[Hamilton also] criticized the Constitutional Convention, which met in
early 1866, for its reluctance to grant black suffrage." Tex. State Library & Archives
Comm'n, Andrew J. Hamilton, in PORTRAITS OF TEXAS GOVERNORS: WAR, RUIN,
AND RECONSTRUCTION,

http://www.tsl.state.tx.us/governors/war/index.html (last vis-

ited Sept. 3, 2009). Governor Hamilton decided not to run for Governor in 1866, and
James Throckmorton won the 1866 election. Id.
129. TEX. CONST. of 1866, art. IV, § 2, available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/
constitutions/text/FAR04.html ("The Supreme Court shall consist of five Justices, any
three of whom shall constitute a quorum. They shall be elected by the qualified votes
of the State at a general election for State or County officers .... "); Id. § 5 ("The
State shall be divided into convenient Judicial Districts. For each District there shall
be elected by the qualified voters thereof, at a general election for State or County
officers, a Judge who shall reside in the same."); Id. § 15 ("There shall be established
in each county in the State, an inferior tribunal, styled the County Court; and there
shall be elected by the persons in each county, who are qualified to vote for members
of the Legislature, a Judge of the County Court . . . ."); Id. § 19 ("There shall be
elected a convenient number of Justices of the Peace .... "); see also JOURNALS OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF TEXAS 1866, supra note 117, at 153.
130. JOURNALS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF TEXAS 1866, supra note
117, at 153.
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A famous telegraph from President Andrew Johnson dated February 13, 1866, to Governor Hamilton speaks volumes. President Johnson stated, "I am still hopeful that in the end matters will take a
different turn here and that loyal representatives will be admitted to
take their seats in the Council of the Nation, From all States. ' 131 The
Author believes it is fairly obvious that there is an undercurrent of
pressure toward Union loyalty, and the recourse during the Convention was to try to negate that as much as possible-again, walking a
tightrope.
This tightrope is evidenced in the Journals of the Convention concerning the judiciary when on March 21, 1866, Delegate Richard S.
Walker offered an amendment proposing that judges should be
elected, and not appointed. 132 A handful of other delegates opposed
this language; however, the motion was eventually adopted and became part of the 1866 Constitution. 133 The result was a state supreme
court with judges who were to be elected by qualified voters.1 34 District Judges, among other state and county officials, were also to be
elected by qualified voters in a general election. 135 However, in the
event of a vacancy in the aforementioned courts (Supreme Court Justices and District Judges), vacancies would be filled by appointment
1 36
by the Governor of Texas.
In the wake of the Civil War, it is clear that Texas wanted to remain

somewhat autonomous and perhaps feared retribution by the Union
North against former secessionists in Texas, all while attempting to
retain a way of life dictated by white males.137 In 1868, West Texas
131. Telegram from Andrew Johnson, supra note 118.

132.

JOURNALS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF TEXAS

1866, supranote

117, at 236 ("I[T]here shall be elected by the qualified voters of the county or counties
composing the County Court district, as hereinafter provided, a Judge of said court,
who shall be a conservator of the peace ....
133. Id. at 236-37.
134. TEX. CONST. of 1866, art. IV, § 2, available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/
constitutions/text/1866index.html ("The Supreme Court shall consist of five Justices,
any three of whom shall constitute a quorum. They shall be elected by the qualified
votes of the State at a general election for State or County officers, and they shall be
elected from their own number a presiding officer, to be styled the Chief Justice
135. Id. § 5 ("The State shall be divided into convenient Judicial Districts. For each
District there shall be elected by the qualified voters thereof, at a general election for
State or County officers, a Judge who shall reside in same .... ").
136. Id. § 10 ("In the case of a vacancy in the offices of Justice of the Supreme
Court, Judges of the District Court, Attorney-General, and District Attorneys, the
Governor of the State shall have power to fill the same by appointment, which shall
continue in force until the office can be filled at the next general election for State or
county officers, and the successor duly qualified.").
137. See TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. V, § 2, available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/
constitutions/text/GART05.html ("The Supreme Court shall consist of three Judges,
any two of whom shall constitute a quorum. They shall be appointed by the Governor,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of nine years. But the
Judges first appointed under this Constitution, shall be so classified by lot, that the
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split from East Texas, and even enacted its own Constitution. 13 This
split was based on internal fighting between one faction called the

"Conservative Republicans," who were in favor of private corporations and had not supported secession and the Civil War, and "Radical
Republicans," who supported issues such 1 3as9 restoring the public
school fund and initiating the split in Texas.

In 1869, the method of selecting supreme court justices switched
back from election by qualified voters to appointment by the governor

with the advice and consent of the senate. 4 ° When vacancies arose,
the governor filled them.' 41 The governor, with the advice and con-

sent of the senate, also appointed judges of the district courts. 4 2
Six years later, in 1876, the judicial selection system switched back
to general elections by all eligible voters for all judicial levels, a system
that was in place ten years prior in 1866.143 Our present Constitution
was passed in 1876 making Texas one of seven states presently in the
where state judges at all levels are elected by the genUnited States
1 44
eral public.
E.

The 1875 Convention and 1876 Constitution

By 1875, when the Constitutional Convention convened to write the
present Constitution, resentment between the eastern and western
parts of Texas that led to Texas's secession from the Union during the

Civil War was not resolved. 145 To further make their point clear reterm of one of them shall expire at the end of every three years. The Judge whose
term shall soonest expire shall be the presiding Judge. All vacancies shall be filled for
the unexpired term. If a vacancy shall occur, or a term shall expire, when the Senate is
not in session, the Governor shall fill the same by appointment, which shall be sent to
the Senate within ten days after that body shall assemble, and, if not confirmed, the
office shall immediately become vacant."); see also Walter L. Buenger, Tex. State Historical Ass'n, Secession, in THE HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE, http://www.tshaon
line.org/handbook/online/articles/SS/mgs2.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2009).
138. See W. TEX. CONST. of 1868, available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitu
tions/text/1868index.html.
139. Carl H. Moneyhon, Tex. State Historical Ass'n, Republican Party, in THE
HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE, http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/
RR/war2.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2009).
140. TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. V, § 2, available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edul
constitutions/text/1869index.html ("The Supreme Court shall consist of three Judges,
any two of whom shall constitute a quorum. They shall be appointed by the Governor
....
.).
141. Id.
142. Id. § 6 ("The State shall be divided into convenient Judicial Districts, for each
of which one Judge shall be appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate ....").
143. See TEX. CONST. of 1876, art. V, available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/
constitutions/text/1876index.html.
144. See AM. BAR ASS'N, FACT SHEET ON JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS IN THE
STATES 1, http://www.abanet.org/leadership/fact-sheet.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2009);
TEX. CONST. of 1876, art. V.
145. See Tex. Const. of 1876, art. I, § 1.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol16/iss3/3
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V16.I3.2

18

King: Failure to Launch: How the Delinquent Politics and Policies of th

2010]

FAILURE TO LAUNCH

garding their preference for general elections concerning the judiciary,
the 1875 delegates made sure that even county judges were to be
elected by qualified voters in the general public on a county-by-county

basis,146 as well as justices of the peace. 47 County clerks, attorney
generals, legislators, and other public officials who affected the laws of
the State of Texas were to be elected as well.' 48

Prior to the Convention, much discourse abounded about where to
lead Texas into the future. In 1874, the Austin Statesman began edito-

rials that called for responses from other newspapers on whether to
have appointed or elected judges. 149 The Houston Telegraph and
Texas Register responded and entered into the discussion concerning
whether appointments or elections of judges is the more appropriate

method for selecting judicial officers. 5 ' The 1874 dialogue started by
Austin's Daily Democratic Statesman noted that "[t]hese judges decide ultimately on the life, liberty and property of every citizen in the

State."''

When reading the plain language of this statement, it is

fairly clear that even though women still did not have suffrage, women

and children were citizens and were meant to be protected.
The Houston Telegraph suggested that elections would be best, but

the Telegraph also cautioned that it would be presumptuous that the
electorate at general would fully understand and be able to ascertain
the qualities and fitness for judicial candidates.' 5 2 Later, the Dallas
Weekly Herald also entered into the discussion and stated its opposi-

tion to election of judges on the grounds that it "opens the door to

corruption."' 5 3 The caution about corruption basically involved the
obvious-that judges might feel dependent or loyal to their political
campaign contributors.' 5 4 Editorials like these from over one hundred years ago captured the reasons given by many across the United

States (not just in Texas) for either opposing or supporting election of
judges. As the Houston and Dallas editorials reflected, both sides
146. TEX. CONST. of 1876, art. V, § 15 ("There shall be established in each county in
the State, an inferior tribunal, styled the County Court; and there shall be elected by
the persons in each county, who are qualified to vote for members of the Legislature,
a Judge of the County Court, who shall be a conservator of the peace, who shall hold
his office for four years, and who shall receive such compensation as may be prescribed by law, and who may be removed from office for neglect of duty, incompetency or malfeasance, in such manner as may be prescribed by law.").
147. Id. § 19 ("There shall be elected a convenient number of Justices of the Peace,
who shall have such civil and criminal jurisdiction ...
148. Id. §§ 7, 13, 14, 18.
149. Cooper, supra note 36, at 327.
150. Id. at 329-30.
151. Id. at 327-28 (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 328-29 ("It is a violent presumption for us to suppose that the fitness of
candidates for judicial offices can be, and is understood among the people as it should
be to enable them to make judicious selections.").
153. Id. at 329. The caution about corruption basically questioned whether judges
might feel dependent or loyal to their political campaign contributors. See id.
154. Id. at 329-33.
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listed fear of corruption to support their positions. 155 Moreover, lack
of accountability, as discussed in the Austin editorial, concerned many
supporters of the elective process.15 6 Partly because of this journalistic dialogue and partly because of personal feelings after the Civil
War, the Texas delegates who framed the new Texas Constitution,
who were mostly rural' 57 and not as urban or cosmopolitan as their
counterparts in the North, were likely concerned about judges being
appointed by Union sympathizers. Therefore, the swing toward an
elected judiciary was made a permanent fixture that remains today.
As a result, it is apparent that the 1876 Constitution "clearly evidences
the determination of the people to overhaul the government completely and to make impossible in the future the abuses which they
suffered at the hands of an autocratic
Governor, a carpetbag Legisla15
ture, and a corrupt Judiciary.' 1
A majority report in the 1875 debates "recommended dividing
[Texas] into five districts, with members of each district electing one of
the five justices of the Texas Supreme Court. District judges were to
be elected within their district of residence."' 59 A minority report
"preferred a general election for Texas Supreme Court justices. 1 6 °
The minority view won out not only for supreme court justices, but for
all appellate judges and district judges; it was approved, became effective on April 18, 1876, and remains what we still have today.1 6 1 In the
155. See id. at 329.
156. Id. at 329. I believe accountability is possible in an elective judiciary; however,
the problem is that within the elective process, there is no real voter education and
voters who vote party lines for judges who feel pressured depending upon their
county to align themselves with a particular party, regardless of where their true party
affiliations may lie. I feel that the power of removal is a very forceful accountability
tool, and that certainly an appointment by advice and consent of 2/3 of the senate and
removal by 2/3 of the senate would be appropriate and is much needed in the current
century that is set to rival previous generations as being the most partisan and bitter
century in not only Texas history, but American history as well. There is a tremendous difference between being subject to "removal" by the voters every four or six
years versus being subject to removal at any time by 2/3 of the senate. I feel the
public, in general, has been a poor watchdog of our family court judges so far, for all
of the aforementioned reasons.
157. Hill, supra note 46, at 347.
158. Cooper, supra note 36, at 330 (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted);
Hill, supra note 46, at 347 ("The provision for the popular election of judges in the
present [1876] constitution was clearly 'a reaction to the excesses and extravagances'
of the Reconstruction era and the bitter experiences with 'carpetbag' judges appointed to the courts by the Reconstruction government.") (citations omitted).
159. Cooper, supra note 36, at 330.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. See id.; TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2 (amended 1891), available at http://texas
history.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth6731/ml/802/ ("The Supreme Court shall consist of
a chief justice and two associate justices .... Said chief justice and associate justices
shall be elected by the qualified voters of the State at a general election, shall hold their
offices for six years, and shall each receive an annual salary .... ") (emphasis added);
Id. § 5 ("The Court of Appeals shall consist of three judges, any two of whom shall
constitute a quorum, and the concurrence of two judges shall be necessary to a deci-
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end, supreme court justices, district judges, and county judges are all
elected by qualified voters in partisan elections, making Texas one of
only seven states in the Union where judges at all levels are elected in
62
such a manner.1
One cannot overstate the role that race and class prejudice played
in the formation of the 1876 Constitution. Among debates concerning
the proper measure to ensure uniformity of opinions, and ironically
the salary of justices, no one seemed really concerned about election
versus appointment until one reads the language on the fifty-second
day on November 4, 1875, when Fletcher Summerfield Stockdale "alluded to the difficulties in the way of the election of judges in some
localities, owing to the ignorance and prejudices of a certain class of
the communities which thought not to control in judicial election, and
said that by his method it would be placed out of the power of local
majorities to elect men to the bench who were inimical to the interests
of the state."1'63 In other words, white men who still clung to a rural
way of life based on racism and class structure. In a war where at least
618,000 Americans died,164 resentment of rural East Texas delegates,
who had depended on slavery for the continued establishment of their
rural and trading livelihoods, were none too fond of being forced to
lose that way of life after the end of the Civil War. These were delegates who wanted the judiciary to be decided by the people and for
the people, assuming those people were white males.
General John H. Whitfield and Fletcher Summerfield Stockdale, in
particular, made several racist remarks expressing concern about "negro rule" in the judiciary. 165 General Whitfield sugar-coated his remarks by further stating, "Not that he had the least prejudice against

sion of said court. They shall be elected by the qualified voters of the State at a general
election.") (emphasis added); Id. § 7 ("The State shall be divided into twenty six judicial districts, which may be increased or diminished by the Legislature. For each district there shall be elected, by the qualified voters thereof, at a general election for
members of the Legislature, a judge, who shall be at least twenty-five years of age,
shall be a citizen of the United States, shall have been a practicing attorney or a judge
of a court in this State for the period of four years, and shall have resided in the
district in which he is elected for two years next before his election ... .
162. AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 144.
163. See DEBATES IN THE TEXAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, at 386
(Seth Shepard McKay ed., 1930), available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitu
tions/pdf/pdf1875debates/indexl875debates.html.
164. BURKE DAVIS, THE CIVIL WAR: STRANGE AND FASCINATING FACTS 215
(Wings Books 1994) (1960).
165. DEBATES IN THE TEXAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, supra note
163, at 386-87 ("Not only should a candidate for judge be well grounded in the law,
but that he should have continued in it for twenty-five years, which would have excluded all danger that he might have been apprehended from the colored man. He
would go as far as anyone in presuming the purity and ability of the judiciary, but was
utterly opposed to the substitute.")
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the negro, but it would force upon1' 6them
a set of district judges elected
6
by the negroes of those districts.'
Thus, clearly there were urban and rural issues in addition to racial
issues. In the end, a majority of the delegates were from rural areas,
and they got their wishes to have an elected judiciary that would best
suit their desires for the future of Texas.
III.

A

CALL FOR MAKING JUDICIAL SELECTIONS A MANDATORY

ISSUE EACH LEGISLATIVE SESSION AND LAUNCHING A

SUCCESSFUL MISSION FOR TRUE JUDICIAL REFORM

"Although the current system of electing judges by popular vote
may have best served Texas in the immediate years after the Civil
War, there has been much debate for many years about whether the
system continues to be effective."1'67 Nevertheless, over sixty-two
years of proposals have been made to reform judicial selection in
Texas without any success.
During the period from the late 1940s until the early 1970s, Texas
became a two-party state; judges were forced to campaign, and a
growing trend toward "merit selection" rather than appointments began to emerge. 68 Unsuccessful reform efforts in Texas date back to
1946,169 when the Texas Civil Judicial Council proposed a merit-based
selection for all Texas state judges, but the state legislature failed to
adopt the proposal. 70 The Texas Civil Judicial Council again rallied
in 1955 for a merit-based system, and this proposal again failed. 7 1
Sixteen years later in 1971, Robert Calvert, the Chief Justice of the
Texas Supreme Court, created a task force to propose merit selection
of judges.' 72 Despite voter support in 1972 to establish a commission
to revise the Constitution regarding merit selection of judges, the legislature ultimately rejected the proposal. 1 73 Two years later, in 1974,
the legislature again rejected more than fifteen proposals
for merit se17
lection of judges and nonpartisan elections of judges. 1
1' 75
In 1986, then Chief Justice John Hill proposed the "Texas Plan.'
The Texas Plan was a merit-selection plan that sought to eliminate
166. Id at 424. This language makes the Author, for lack of a better word, ill.
When one argues that we should look at the framers' intent, the Author would argue
that we should look at the framers' souls.
167. Bleil, supra note 48, at 1090.
168. Cooper, supra note 36, at 332.
169. See AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, HISTORY OF REFORM EFFORTS: TEXAS, http://
www.j udicialselection.us/j udicial-selection/reformefforts/failedreformefforts.cfm?
state=tx, for a detailed and very accurate description of unsuccessful reform efforts of
the Texas state judiciary (last visited Sept. 20, 2009).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.; Cooper, supra note 36, at 332.
173. Cooper, supra note 36, at 333.
174. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, supra note 169.
175. Id.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol16/iss3/3
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V16.I3.2

22

King: Failure to Launch: How the Delinquent Politics and Policies of th

20101

FAILURE TO LAUNCH

176
partisan elections at the appellate level and Supreme Court level.
"By focusing on merit, not 'electability,' the Texas Plan [would have
opened] up the opportunity for judicial service to qualified lawyers
who would otherwise not be inclined to political participation. The
pool of qualified candiTexas Plan would thereby [have increased] 1the
77
dates from which judges may be elected."'

Under the Texas Plan, a nomination commission would screen judicial candidates, decreasing the potential for a low voter turnout who
simply vote straight ticket.178 Further, the likelihood that voters who
do not vote straight ticket but are often uneducated and feel pressured
to simply check a box by someone's name-anyone's name, or worse,
do not check a box at all-is decreased.' 7 9 The problem, though, is
the Texas Plan did not address judges at the trial court level where the
overwhelming majority of cases begin and end, 18 0 including family
court judges, but rather only proposed that "[j]udges for the supreme
court, the court of criminal appeals, and the courts of appeals would
be elected by the people in non-partisan uncontested confirmation
elections."' 1
In 1987, the Texas legislature
created a committee to examine judi1 82
cial selection in Texas:
[T]he committee's final report called for a merit election system for
appellate judges, where a screening commission recommended candidates to the governor, the governor nominated a candidate to be
confirmed by the senate, and the candidate stood in an initial confirmation election and in retention elections thereafter; a nonpartisan
election system for trial court judges; elimination of straight-ticket
voting in judicial elections; lower campaign contribution limits and a
shorter time period for accepting campaign1 83
contributions; and [for
the first time] voter information pamphlets.
A strong wind swept Austin in 1994 when "Lieutenant Governor
Bob Bullock appointed a select group to devise the best judicial selection method and instructed the group to consider every possible
method. In late 1994, the appointed group recommended a plan that
proposed merit selection for appellate judges and nonpartisan elections, with re-election by voter approval, for district court judges."184
The result was legislation that called for nonpartisan elections of ap176. Orrin W. Johnson & Laura Johnson Urbis, JudicialSelection in Texas: A Gathering Storm?, 23 TEX. TECH L. REv. 525, 559 (1992); AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y, supra
note 169.
177. Hill, supra note 46, at 361.
178. Johnson & Urbis, supra note 176, at 562.
179. Id. at 559-62.
180. Id. at 562.
181. Hill, supra note 46, at 356; see also AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y, supra note 169.
182. AM. JUDICATURE SoC'Y, supra note 169.
183. Id.
184. Bleil, supra note 48, at 1100.
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pellate judges and district court judges, and the elimination of
straight-ticket voting in judicial elections was proposed; however, the
bill stalled. 8 ' Although this was a noble approach at attempting to
correct the "justice for sale" image that the average citizen feels controls Texas courts, the movement died. 86
In 1996 an "appoint-elect-retain" plan was proposed, but nothing
was passed. 8 7 A year later the proposed change switched from merit
and/or appointment to simply nonpartisan elections and the elimination of straight-ticket voting.18 8 Even this relatively simple change to
an antiquated Constitution failed after passing the house and being
stalled in the senate. 1 89 Two years later in 1999, another appointmentretention plan was proposed. 190 This time, the roles were reversed;
the bill passed the senate but died in the house. 19 '
In 2001 the senate and the Judicial Committee of the House approved a measure for the appointment by the governor for justices of
the Texas Supreme Court and judges of the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, but the legislative session ended.' 92 In 2003, again, a senate
bill calling for appointment by the governor with retention of the Supreme Court and Court of Criminal Appeals was approved in the
house, but stalled in the senate. 9 3
Some have stated that "[o]ne obstacle to judicial selection reform in
Texas is the fact that the Texas legislature only meets for six months
every two years." 194 To this, the Author wholeheartedly disagrees. If
the legislature can fast track such issues as a proposed constitutional
amendment concerning same-sex marriage; the October 2008 halt to
Governor Perry's executive order concerning immunization of teenage girls for the human papillomavirus (HPV); or in the 2007 legislative session when not one, but two measures were proposed to make
English the official language of Texas; then why after two decades of
aggressive proposals has nothing been done concerning the preservation of the branch of government where any litigant with a justiciable
cause of action may go to have his or her legal dispute addressed with
the hope that all parties will be treated under a system of "Equal Justice Under the Law"? It is a question that boggles the mind, except
when you consider how partisan Texas is. Thus, it is not hard to imagine how certain parties' agendas play such an important part in what
bills get fast-tracked, and what bills get stalled or tabled. Further, one
185.

AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y, supra note

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See, e.g., Bleil, supra note 48; Hill, supra note 46, at 344.
AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y, supra note 169.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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cannot ignore the power of the lobbyists in Austin who play a significant role in setting legislative agenda; thus, judicial reform gets
pushed to the sidelines until it is too late for significant discussion and
a vote.
IV.

THE DANGERS OF PARTISAN ELECTIONS

In the United States, there are nine states where partisan elections
decide trial courts of general jurisdiction, including family courts.' 9 5
These states, including Texas, are Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and West Virginia. 19 6 Of these
nine states, the only state where the judicial candidate's party affiliation is not listed on the ballot is Ohio.'9 7 States with partisan elections
for appellate courts and courts of "last resort" include Texas, Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. 198 It
is important to note that of the aforementioned nine states that conduct partisan elections for judges of original jurisdiction, two of the
nine then switch to a combined election plus merit-based plan at the
appellate level-New York and Tennessee.' 9 9
Thus, in summary, Texas is one of only seven states in the entire
country where state judges at all levels are seated based on partisan
elections.2 °° It is perplexing as to why the other forty-three states in
the union have decided to use other methods to select judges including merit-based plans, combinations of merit plus election, non-partisan elections, and appointments, including life appointments.20 1
A recent survey has stated that among judges, 52% supported nonpartisan elections. Non-partisan elections free up the judges' time allowing them to concentrate on making informed rulings and spend
less time worrying about reelection.20 2 However, only 21% favored
initial appointment with subsequent retention elections.20 3 Perhaps
this shows that a noticeable percentage of judges favor lifelong ap195.

AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y., JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE

AND GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS 3, 8, 10 (2009), http://www.ajs.org/selection/
docs/Judicial%20Selection%20Charts%208-09.pdf.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 9.
198. Id. at 4, 6, 9, 10.
199. Id. at 3, 8, 10.
200. Id. at 3, 10.
201. Id. at 3; see also LARRY C. BERKSON UPDATED BY RACHEL CAULFIELD, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A SPECIAL REPORT

2-3 (2004), http://www.

ajs.org/selection/docs/Berkson%205-09.pdf. See AM. JUDICATURE
OF JUDICIAL

SELECTION:

SELECTION

OF JUDGES,

SOC'Y.,

METHODS

http://www.judicialselection.usl

judicialselection/methods/selection-of-judges.cfm?state= (last visited Sept. 7, 2009)
for a more detailed statistical analysis of the various methods of judicial selection in
the United States.
202. See Adam Liptak, American Exception: Rendering Justice, with One Eye on
Re-Election, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.coml
2008/05/25/us/25exception.html.
203. Id.
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When one considers that 43% of district judges and

appellate justices in Texas favor a plan where they would be appointed
by the governor with approval by two-thirds of the senate, then be
subject to a non-partisan initial election one year later and thereafter
be subject to periodic retention elections, one wonders if state judges
are not serving their own political agendas or the agendas of their
donors.2 o5

Some have also criticized the extent to which special interest groups
influence partisan judicial elections. 20 6 With partisan or non-partisan
elections, there is a very real probability that the candidate that
spends the most will win. 20 7 Further, there is a very real concern that
campaign contributions might bias an elected judge. 0 s Partisan politics are not the only potential form of bias, though. Bias comes in all
forms. As in Texas, across the nation, "Americans have struggled
since colonial times with the notion that judges should be independent, yet accountable to the people. '2 9 However, bias permeates all
of us in our day-to-day decision-making and can affect an elected
judge's decision-making ability. Bias is subjective and very subtle, and
it can affect not only elected judges but also appointed judges.
A further problem with partisan elections is name confusion. 210
Judge Charles Bleil writes in his article about one of the most notori211
ous (and unfortunate) examples of name confusion among voters.
Don Yarbrough, an individual unknown to the general public, did not
have any support in his campaign, and in fact, did not campaign for his
slot on the Texas Supreme Court.21 2 It is argued that the public confused his name with prominent and respected individuals who had minor differences in the spelling of their names.213 Eventually,
Yarbrough's name confusion won him the battle in terms of being
204. The Author would not like to be presumptuous, but perhaps this percentage of
individuals is concerned about job security. A second theory would be that these
judges enjoy the current system because it has been in place for over a century and
has become the status quo.
205. TEX. OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN. & STATE BAR OF TEX., supra note 3. A fairly
significant percentage, not only of judges, but also court personnel and attorneys
favor this plan. The proposed plan was that "[d]istrict and appellate judges in Texas
should be appointed by the Governor, subject to the approval of two-thirds of the
Senate; then be subject to an open, contested but non-partisan initial election approximately one year after assuming office; and thereafter be subject to periodic retention
elections where people vote to determine whether the judge should remain in office."
Id. Forty-three (43%) percent of judges, fifty-three (53%) percent of attorneys, and
half of court personnel favor this judicial selection plan. Id.
206. See generally Judith D. Moran, Judicial Independence in Family Courts: Beyond the Election-Appointment Dichotomy, 37 FAM. L.Q. 361 (2003).
207. Id. at 362-63.
208. Johnson & Urbis, supra note 176, at 543-68.
209. Cooper, supra note 36, at 317; see generally Bleil, supra note 48.
210. See Bleil, supra note 48, at 1092-93.
211. Id.
212. Bleil, supra note 48, at 1093.
213. Id.
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elected to the bench, but it cost him the war.21 4 He resigned under
pressure after being indicted for perjury and forgery for events before
his election on fifty-three violations of the law.2 15 Other examples to
which Judge Bleil cites are Gene Kelly's unsuccessful run for the
Texas Supreme Court (no relation to the man whom everyone associates with "Singing in the Rain"), George Bush's successful run for the
Court of Criminal Appeals (no relation to either George H.W. Bush
or his son George W. Bush), among others.2 16
A.

The Dangers of Judicial Bias (Race, Gender,
Economics, and Life Experiences)

Judicial bias is something that no one prefers to talk about, but it is
present, and all trial lawyers know it.2 17 We all view the world
through our own set of colored glasses, and the judiciary is no different. This section discusses several ways in which bias permeates our
judiciary, even though "[t]he importance of detachment, disinterest
and impartiality to good judging is so deeply imbedded in our legal
mythology that acknowledging judges as representatives
can be per'218
ceived as a threat to the judicial function.
"[T]rial court decision making, by its very nature, challenges traditional images of judges as detached, disinterested experts applying objective standard to dispute resolution. State trial judges are most
often called upon to resolve highly personal, value-laden disputes. 21 9
While some have stated that this is particularly true in criminal matters, because of the highly charged emotions involved in family law
matters, the Author would argue that the proposition of personal,
value-laden disputes is equal, if not more so, in family matters as it is
in criminal matters. 22 0 Thus, in this realm of broad discretion, judges
view the facts, the parties, the issues, the witnesses, the jurors, and all
other aspects of the case while wearing colored lenses that, even when
there are the best of intentions, are hard to filter.
As far as we have come as a nation concerning race relations, there
are still instances where judges have been under attack in what is referred to as "race recusal. '221 In an election year where the United
States elected an African-American president and had a Latino presidential candidate who speaks fluent Spanish, the Author believes the
country as a whole has made great strides in "racial tolerance," or
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1093-94.
217. See Ifill, supra note 28.
218. Id. at 97. "The very suggestion that judges can represent a community counters the traditional view of judges as impartial decision makers." Id. (emphasizing
the importance of racial diversity in the makeup of state judiciaries).
219. Id. at 103.
220. See id.

221. See id. at 114-16.
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"color-blindness." However, we are far from achieving a color-blind
society. Having been born in Birmingham and having grown up in the
South, the Author can attest that more needs to be done. However,
arguing that a particular judge should feel pressured to step down in
response to a recusal motion that was filed for no other reason than
the judge's race is a preposterous proposition. Perhaps with supporting evidence that the actual facts of the case are similar to a judge's
own personal experience, then race could play a role. For example, if
a judge was a civil rights advocate in the 1960s who happened to
march and protest for equal rights and then decades later faces a First
Amendment case with similar facts (for example, the recent marches
by Mexican immigrants), or the judge presides over a case involving
racial discrimination when that judge has experienced personal discrimination in the past, these circumstances might be called into question as grounds for recusal. However, the point is not the race, but
rather the past personal experiences of the judges.2 2 2
Gender bias is also present in our judiciary. 2 3 In the family courts,
which have been referred to as "stepchildren,"2 2' 4 the environment is
ripe for gender discrimination against women, who are usually the
ones that will be raising the children, that are the subject matter of
litigation.2 2 5 Currently in the family law courts of Tarrant County,
Texas, seven men preside as judges of which two are district court
judges, and five are associate judges.22 6 Across Texas in general, there
are more female family court judges than male judges.22 7 At first
glance, one would think that because more than 50% of family court
judges are female, this statistic should benefit female litigants. The
problem is that, as with race, it is about the judge's personal
experiences.
When a family associate or district court judge has experienced a
bitter divorce or bitter litigation concerning child support and visitation of his or her own children, should that judge recuse himself or
herself from hearing the case? Should a male judge who is paying
child support for one or more children and who feels he is paying
more than his fair share be allowed to hear a case by a woman seeking
an increase in child support? Should a female judge who feels the
222. See Steven Zeidman, Careful What You Wish For: Tough Questions, Honest
Answers, and Innovative Approaches to Appointive Judicial Selection, 34 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 473, 477 (2007) (proposing a vetting system for judicial candidates based on
personal characteristics and temperament).
223. See Karen Czapanskiy, Gender Bias in the Courts: Social Change Strategies, 4
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1990).
224. See May, supra note 7.
225. As of 2002, approximately 27,269,757 single women (or 9.2% of the U.S. population) were heads of households taking care of minor children. See DIVORCE MAGAzINE, supra note 10.
226. Tarrant County Family Law Bar Association, Tarrant County Family Law
Judges, http://www.tcflba.com/Judges.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2009).
227. See id.
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obligor in her own conservatorship is not paying his fair share be allowed to hear a case by a woman with a similar plight? These are
questions that are never addressed during election season or during
family court proceedings. Judges should not be personally biased because they are divorced, a single parent, or the parent paying child
support. However, the reality is that we all look at the world through
certain sets of lenses, and making such information available to the
general public when the general public chooses judges that decide the
fates of thousands of Texas children would help make better educated
voters Such general information should be made available to the
public prior to the public entering the ballot box.2 28
Article V, Section 11 of the Texas Constitution states that "[n]o
judge shall sit in any case wherein the judge may be interested .... -229
Should a judge's particular personal experiences concerning divorce,
custody, child support, etc. be included in the category of "any other
reason"? 23" The importance of negating judicial bias is also stated in
Rule 18b of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which proscribes: "[a]
judge shall recuse himself in any proceeding in which: (a) his impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . .. ,
While it may seem an
invasion into a judge's private life, we already request our elected
judges to recuse themselves if they have worked with one of the parties' counsel, personally own stock in corporations, or for any other
matter that might create actual bias or the perception of bias.23 2 Thus,
it would seem acceptable when dealing with families and children to
know a bit of information about whether a judge might be biased because of his or her own personal family court experiences.
The following are hypothetical conflicts pertinent to the family
court system that emphasize potential problems:
Hypothetical 1:
Judge A has been assigned a family law case involving M (mother)
and F (father) where C (child) is the subject matter of the litigation.
M has filed a motion to increase child support. Unbeknownst to M,
Judge A has been personally embroiled in child support litigation.
Should this be ground for recusal?
Hypothetical 2:
Judge A has been assigned a family law case involving M (mother)
and F (father) where C (child) is the subject matter of the litigation.
F is seeking a reduction in child support because of his increased
needs because of his new family and new minor children to support.
Unbeknownst to M, Judge A has been personally embroiled in child
support litigation. Should this be ground for recusal?
228. Ifill, supra note 28, at 145.
229. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11.
230. See id.

231.

TEX.

R. Civ. P. 18(a)-(b) (emphasis added).

232. Id. 18(b)(2).

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

29

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 16 [2022], Iss. 3, Art. 3

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

Hypothetical 3:
Judge A has been assigned a family law case involving M (mother)
and F (father) where C (child) is the subject matter of the litigation.
M and F are going through a bitter divorce. Unbeknownst to M and
F, Judge A is personally going through or has just completed a bitter
divorce. Judge A is asked to decide an equitable property settlement between M and F as well as conservatorship issues and visitation. Should this be grounds for recusal?
These are issues that lawyers all know occur, but the Author has never
heard nor personally witnessed a case where these issues were
brought up for questioning a judge's ability to hear a family law case
in an impartial manner. Being an effective member of the judiciary is
applying law to facts, without bias. Of course, it is hard for judges, like
anyone else, to leave their home lives at home when they go to work.
One should not seek a judicial position if one cannot be impartial on
the bench, especially when minor children are involved.
Should a judge's personal economic circumstances be grounds for
recusal? Should parties, especially the top percent of income earners,
be punished when attempting to obtain child support payments in excess of the recommended statutory guidelines? Should a judge recuse
herself from a modification lawsuit to increase child support if she has
a child with special needs that she is unable to meet alone and has
tried and failed to obtain support for the child from the other parent?
Should judicial candidates' personal background be made public so
that voters will have a better understanding of who these candidates
are? The Author would argue an emphatic "Yes." For example, the
Author worked for a successful personal injury trial law firm for almost seven years prior to entering law school. The Author's firm did
almost exclusively plaintiff's work. Should that information be made
available to the general public if any former members of the firm
choose to run for judge? Yes, of course it should, because despite the
fact that legal scholars try extremely hard to apply law to facts, everyone still sees the world through different colored lenses.
Texans, and more importantly Americans, should never forget that
"the right to an impartial judge is guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,"2 3' 3 and that "[l]itigants may
seek to disqualify a judge who has an interest in the outcome of the
litigation, has actual bias towards one of the parties or has even the
appearance of bias."2'3 4 Thus, the Author would extend judicial bias in
family law matters to those judges who are unable to entirely distance
themselves from the emotional, gender, and financial issues that are
unique to family court cases. Additionally, the trial judge is the one
who is closer to the dispute by interacting directly with the attorneys,
parties, witnesses, and jurors; they exercise their judicial discretion
233. Ifill, supra note 28, at 98.

234. Id.
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much broader than appellate judges who often rule without oral argument and rely heavily on the trial court record and appellate briefs
summarizing the issues to determine whether there was an abuse of
discretion on the trial judge's part.235
Thus, the problem of judicial bias is not one that can be completely
ratified by the appellate process. Very few cases ever get appealed.236
The costs are daunting, and appellate courts are a bit frightening to
even the most experienced of attorneys. Of the cases that get appealed, most are affirmed. 237 Thus, it begs the question why so much
of the attention on how we select judges in our state focuses on appellate justices, Texas Supreme Court justices, and judges of the Criminal
Court of Appeals. As with local politics (school boards, councilpersons, mayors, etc.), should not our focus concerning the manner in
which we select judges be focused on district and county judges and
justices of the peace?
The Author would propose that we either amend the Texas Government Code to include specific recusal provisions for family court
judges, or amend the Texas Family Code to incorporate similar recusal
provisions, or both. The Author is well aware that some will argue
this is discriminatory and that it could eliminate potential members
from our family court benches who perhaps, because of their personal
experiences, could argue that they are even more qualified to hear
family law cases. However, given the alarming statistics on the
amount of time spent on family law cases and the overwhelming percentage of family court cases that never make it to the appellate court
level, 38 the Author feels the stakes are too high to risk bias when
determining years of a child's future. These proposals are in addition
to the concern that campaign contributions during an election year
might perhaps bias an elected judge. 3 9
V.

UNTIL REFORM IS MADE: PROACTIVE SOLUTIONS TO A

COMPLEX PROBLEM THAT WE CAN LAUNCH NoW-BETTER
PUBLIC EDUCATION AND IMPROVED JUDICIAL SURVEYS

Until such time as our state legislature actually launches a genuine
and concerted effort to reform our judiciary, there are two simple solutions to help mitigate the damage caused by partisan elections.
These band-aids are (1) better public education and (2) better judicial
surveys.
235. See Maixner v. Maixner, 641 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no
writ).
236. See OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., supra note 15, at 4.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. Johnson & Urbis, supra note 176, at 543-68.
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Better Public Education

Most of the general public in Texas is not well versed in the law and
often too busy to pay much attention to elections that do not involve
high-profile figures such as presidents, governors, and other high-level
state officials.2 4 ° Most do not understand how the law works, other
than what they view on popular television shows and in sound bites on
the twenty-four-hour news networks, which is often incredibly
inaccurate.2 4 1
Many short law review and other published articles about elected
judges have been written over the years that are basically a formal
introduction of a particular elected judge to the public, 242 but most
citizens might not be aware of their existence. Former Chief Justice
John Hill has suggested that "[n]either the Legislature, political parties, the State Bar, nor sitting judges ought to presume to know what a
majority of Texans might desire with regard to the selection of their
judges, if given a fair chance to consider the subject [whether to have
appointed or elected appellate and supreme court justices]. It is only
when an alternative is to be proposed to the voters that the political
process is adequately invoked and genuine debate243
can be had over the
merits of competing plans for judicial selection.
The Author strongly agrees, but is not convinced that the general
public would fully comprehend what is really going on when it comes
to local elections and to our appellate and supreme court judiciary.
At least in the Author's community, most constituents vote straight
ticket, disregarding qualifications, history, and, most importantly,
whether a particular judge will apply the applicable law to the facts in
a fair and unbiased
manner.2 4 4 Because of the opportunity to vote
"straight party, '2 45 in some counties in Texas, one political party
dominates virtually the entire judiciary in that county without realiz240. Judith L. Maute, Selecting Justice in State Courts: The Ballot Box or the
Backroom?, 41 S. TEX. L. REv. 1197, 1206 (2000).
241. See id.
242. George C. Hanks, Jr., Children and the Law in Texas: What Parents Should
Know, 38 Hous. LAW. 49, 49 (2000) (writing about RAMONA FREEMAN JOHN, CHILDREN AND THE LAW IN TEXAS: WHAT PARENTS SHOULD KNOW

(1999)); Sharon

Hemphill, An Interview With Linda Motheral, Judge of the 257th District Court, 39
Hous. LAW. 57, 57 (2002); Suzanne Tice, Profile: Texas Supreme Court Justice Craig
Enoch, 62 TEX. B.J. 682, 682 (1999); The State Bar and Beyond: Willett Joins Supreme
Court of Texas, 68 TEX. B.J. 890, 890 (2005).
243. Hill, supra note 46, at 355.
244. Thomas R. Phillips, J., Supreme Court of Tex., Big Money in Texas Judicial
Elections: The Sickness and its Remedies, Responses to Paul Carrington before
Southern Methodist University School of Law, in 53 SMU L. REv. 281, 283 (2000).
245. FORD, supra note 43, at 141 (noting that "partisan elections shelter-sometimes [even] foster incompetence as distinguished judges of the minority party are
swept out, often to be replaced by inferior candidates of the political majority") (citation omitted).
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ing that judges are individuals with different personalities and that no
two Republicans and no two Democrats are the same.2 46
B.

Better Judicial Surveys

For efficiency purposes, given that Texas has 254 counties, the Author will focus on the five largest metropolitan areas and how they
conduct their judicial surveys. These are (in order by population largest to smallest): Houston (Harris County), San Antonio (Bexar
County), Dallas (Dallas County), Austin (Travis County), and Fort
Worth (Tarrant County).
The Houston Bar Association monitors judges in the greater Houston area through judicial polls administered by its Judicial Commit-

tee.2 47

There are three judicial polls, and the polls are not

endorsements of judicial candidates by the Houston Bar Association,
but rather serve a public education service.24 8 Polls have been conducted since 1973.249 The first of the three polls is the Judicial Candidate Qualification Poll, which is held before primaries in election
years.250 Members are asked to rate the judge as "qualified," "not
qualified," "well qualified," or "not rated" (if the member has no
knowledge or opinion). 25 1 The second poll is the Judicial Preference
Poll, which is conducted before the general election in November. 252
Members are asked to indicate for whom they would vote in contested
judicial races. 253 The third poll is the Judicial Evaluation Poll that is
246. See also id. at 155 (discussing the results of the 1998 elections in Harris County
and how the results "all had to do with politics"); id. at 109 (discussing how the Houston system for electing judges is highly politicized and that so long as judges run on
party lines, there will always be partisan rivalry in election years). I would also add
that so long as religion is allowed to infiltrate our political parties along with language
suggesting that one must choose whether you are with the United States or against it,
we will never have a truly adversarial election process based on debate of the issues
that form the legacy our children will inherit from us.
247. The Judicial Polls Committee develops and distributes, in election years, a judicial candidate qualification and judicial preference poll, and in non-election years, a
judicial evaluation poll to HBA members. The committee is also responsible for disseminating the results of these polls to members and the public. See Judicial Poll
Results, Houston Bar Association, http://www.hba.org/folder-poll-results/poll-results.
htm.
248. Much thanks is given to David A. Chaumette, a partner at Baker & McKenzie,
L.L.P., and co-chair of the Judicial Polls Committee; Ben Aderhold of Looper Reed
& McGraw, co-chair of the Judicial Polls Committee; and Tara Shockley, Communications Director for the Houston Bar Association, who were very helpful with understanding the judicial polls in Houston.
249. Bonnie Gangelhoff, The Worst Judge in Harris County?, Hous. PRESS NEWS,
Aug. 31, 1995, http://www.houstonpress.com/1995-08-31/news/the-worst-judge-inharris-county/full.
250. HOUSTON BAR Ass'N, 2008 JUDICIAL CANDIDATE QUALIFICATION POLL
(2008), http://www.hba.org/folder-poll-results/qual08.pdf.
251. Id.
252. HOUSTON BAR Ass'N, 2008 JUDICIAL PREFERENCE POLL RESULTS (2008),
http://www.hba.org/home-elements/poll08.pdf.
253. Id.
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conducted after the election.25 4 Members are asked to evaluate
judges who have sat on the bench for at least six months on a set of
criteria. 5 Members are also asked to evaluate only if they have personal and firsthand knowledge of the judge.25 6 These results are made
available online. 5 7 In addition, the Houston Bar Association goes
further by publishing summaries of key decisions in family courts broken down by judge.25 8 This information is not only helpful to the public, but to attorneys and legal scholars as well.
The San Antonio Bar Association, like the other highly populated
urban areas the Author surveyed, conducts two polls. 25 9 A judicial
preference poll is conducted during election years as well as a judicial
evaluation poll during non-election years.26 ° In Dallas County, attorneys are sent surveys to evaluate judges by ranking them as "Excellent," "Acceptable," or "Needs Improvement."'26 1 The most recent
judicial poll at the time this Article was written was conducted in
2009.262

In Austin, two polls are conducted by the Judicial Affairs Committee. 263 The first is a Judicial Evaluation Poll that is conducted every
two years (odd years) in January. 264 The Evaluation Poll includes all
judges who have been in a judicial position for at least eighteen
months. 6 5 Unlike the other polls in the other five cities, the Austin
Judicial Poll is a bit more thorough. 6 6 In addition to the standard
questions (in Austin, there are five) about temperament, applying the
correct law, impartiality, work ethic, and an overall evaluation, the
questionnaire asks for demographic information of the attorneys who
vote.267
254. HOUSTON BAR ASS'N, 2009 JUDICIAL EVALUATION RESULTS (2009), http://
www.hba.org/folder-poll-results/2009evaluationresults.pdf.
255. Press Release, Houston Bar Ass'n, Houston Bar Association Judicial Evaluation Results (May 2009), http://www.hba.org/folder-poll-results/2009%20Result%20
letter.pdf.
256. See Judicial Poll Results, supra note 248.
257. See, e.g., HOUSTON BAR Ass'N, supra note 252; HOUSTON BAR ASs'N, supra
note 254.
258. See Houston-Opinions.com, http://www.houston-opinions.com/HC-CivilCourts-and-Judges.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
259. The Author would like to thank Kim Palmer at the San Antonio Bar Association for her assistance in explaining San Antonio's judicial polls and surveys.
260. See HOUSTON BAR Ass'N, 2006 JUDICIAL PREFERENCE POLL (2006), www.
hba.org/folder-poll-results/prefpol06.pdf.
261. See DALLAS BAR ASS'N, 2009 JUDICIAL EVALUATION POLL (2009), www.dallasbar.org/j udiciary/poll_2009.asp.
262. Id.
263. Austin Bar Association, Judicial Affairs Committee, http://www.austinbar.org/
pages/judicial-affairs (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. AUSTIN BAR ASS'N, 2007 JUDICIAL EVALUATION POLL (2007), http://www.
austinbar.org/assets/pdfs/2007JudicialEvalPoll.pdf.
267. Id.
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The Austin Bar Association also conducts a survey during election
years as well.2 68 It is a Judicial Preference Poll that is conducted every
two years (even years) in January prior to the primary election. 269
The Preference Poll includes only those candidates who are contested.27 ° While the Author admires the Austin Bar Association for
including demographic information so voters know who voted, the
Author feels strongly that all judges should be evaluated in a preferential poll regardless of whether they are in an uncontested election or
not. Just because a judge is not contested, the Author believes that
they should still be evaluated in election years as contenders in judicial races. To do otherwise proffers bias in favor of uncontested presiding judges.
In Tarrant County, attorneys are sent surveys that evaluate family
court judges. 271 The Tarrant County Bar Association (TCBA) conducts two types of judicial polls. 27 2 In non-election years, the Judicial
Evaluation covers judges of all courts of record, including federal
courts, and inquires about each judge's qualifications. 73 The Judicial
Preference Polls are conducted during an election year, and TCBA
members express their views on the qualifications of judicial candidates through these non-partisan polls. Results of the evaluations and
polls are made public.2 74 For Judicial Qualifications Polls during election years, voters are asked to choose between: "Not
Qualified,"
27
"Qualified," or "Well Qualified" for each candidate. 1
Texas's judicial surveys in these five largest metropolitan areas in
our state fall short in several ways-not dissimilar to a poorly written
multiple choice exam where qualified answers are not allowed. Other
states, as discussed below, allow for written comments in their judicial
surveys. The Author believes that, especially in a partisan election
state, written comments would help cut through party lines and provide valuable (and more personal) information to voters.27 6 Written
268. See Austin Bar Association, supra note 263.
269. Id.
270. AUSTIN BAR Ass'N, supra note 266.
271. See Tarrant County Bar Association, http://www.tarrantbar.org/Default.aspx?
tabid=58 (last visited Sept. 19, 2009).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See, e.g., TARRANT COUNTY BAR Ass'N, 2005 JUDICIAL EVALUATION, http://

www.tarrantbar.org/Portals/0/Uploads/JudicialEvaluation_2005.pdf (last visited Oct.
1, 2009).
276. An already used workable model could be the platform for including written
comments in evaluations of Texas judges. This workable model is the form that attorneys use when seeking to become eligible to sit for the board certification exam in
Texas. The attorney seeking board certification, for example, must contact her or his
prior counsel and obtain evaluations and recommendations from them based on that
particular attorney's conduct throughout the litigation. These recommendations include written comments about the attorney's competence, reputation, and professionalism during the course of the litigation.
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comments, if made available to the public and if understood by the
public, would be very helpful in making educated decisions of elected
judges in our state. The Author feels it would also help to restore the
general public's perception of attorneys and the judiciary.2 7 7
VI.

EXAMPLES FROM THE STATES OF WASHINGTON,

KANSAS,

COLORADO, AND NEVADA

In the State of Washington, two bar members, Salvador Mungia and
John A. Miller, oversaw a successful survey project in 2008 to review
elected judges.27 8 One unique aspect of the project was that it included surveys from jurors. 9 Judge Thomas Larkin commented on
the inclusion of jurors' remarks by stating that "[t]he jurors' comments might be the most objective measure of the way a judge does
'281
his or her job, 280 because "[t]hey don't have a dog in the fight."
Judicial surveys
can be "humbling at best and potentially embarrass282
ing at worst.1
A ballot project in Kansas, where supreme court justices are appointed, but the voters decide every six years whether to retain the
judges, involves surveys to help voters become better educated and
"decide how to vote. '283 The Author suggests that a system like this,
if used in a deeply divided partisan state such as Texas, would facilitate more educated voting decisions not based on strict party lines.28 4
Proponents of the Kansas system have stated that survey results available online should improve judicial performance. 8 5 Kansas's judicial
surveys, that are made available online, even make recommendations
to voters on whom to keep and whom to replace.28 6 This is similar to
the days when groups like the League of Women Voters and other
concerned groups transmitted news via print media (newspapers,
277. The Author has been licensed since 2002 and has been a member of the local
bar for several years. However, she has yet to receive a judicial survey. This is particularly disconcerting for her given that 2008 was an election year and several judicial
slots in Tarrant County were contested.
278. Adam Lynn, Judging the Judges: Bar Association Survey Rates Pierce County
Judiciary, THE NEws TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), June 1, 2008, at Al.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. (remarks by Washington bar member Salvador Mungia who co-oversaw
the project).
283. John Hanna, Reports on Kansas Judges to go Online This Month, LAWRENCE
J.-WORLD, Aug. 5, 2008, at B8, available at http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2008/aug/
05/reports-kansasjudges-go-online-month/.
284. Six other states currently have a similar evaluation system to Kansas's system.
They are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Tennessee, Utah, and our neighbors directly to
the west, New Mexico. Id.
285. Id.
286. See, e.g., Jesse Fray, Report Recommends Judges Malone and Martin be Retained, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, Aug. 29, 2008, at B1, available at http://www2.ljworld.
com/news/2008/aug/29/report recommends-judges malone and martin-bereta/.
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pamphlets, and the like). Having immediate online access would provide valuable information to voters who increasingly receive their
news from internet sources instead of reading the morning paper with
their coffee. Thus, unlike the survey conducted in 1998, the Washington state project includes not only numerical rankings, but written
comments.2 8 7

Colorado has perhaps engaged in an even bolder survey project.288
The State Commission on Judicial Performance and local commissions
complete their evaluations of justices and judges.289 The results are
not only made available to the public, but also the recommendations.29 ° These results and recommendations are made available online, and are mailed to each voter's household in the State of
Colorado in what is called the "Blue Book."' 291 According to Paul
Farley, the Chair of the State Commission on Judicial Performance,
the purpose of this program is to try to "strike an extremely difficult
balance by making judges accountable to the public without becoming
involved in politics. ' 29 2 As the Author is proposing in this Article,
Mr. Farley agrees that "[i]t is important that citizens take the time to
review the information the commissions have provided and cast informed votes on Election Day."2'93

In Nevada, on May 18, 2008, the Las Vegas Review-Journal released the results of 800 lawyers in southern Nevada.2 94 Thomas
Mitchell, editor of the Review-Journal, said he originated the survey
to help voters.295 Mr. Mitchell stated that "[s]ome of the most important votes citizens can cast are for our judges and justices, but most of
us have little contact with the courts or lawyers and have little personal knowledge of what makes a good judge. '296 During the sixteen
years the survey has been in place, some judges with poor ratings de287. Written comments provide immeasurable information that often do not fit
squarely in a choice of A, B, or C. As an adjunct law professor, the Author finds
students' written comments are much more valuable than statistical data that is often
confusing and difficult to interpret. See also Lynn, supra note 278.
288. See Colo. Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation, Commissions on Judicial
(last visited
Performance, http://www.coloradojudicialperformance.gov/index.cfm
Oct. 1, 2009).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Press Release, Colo. State Comm'n on Judicial Performance, Judge Evaluations Available on Internet August 8, at 1 (Aug. 7, 2006), available at http://www.
courts.state.co.us/userfiles/File/CourtProbation/OlstJudicialDistrict/j udge-evalua
tions.pdf.
292. Id. at 2.
293. Id.
294. A.D. Hopkins, Judging the Judges: Nearly 800 Lawyers Turn in JudicialPerformance Evaluation Grades, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., May 18, 2008, available at http://
www.lvrj.com/news/19053459.html.
295. Id.
296. Id. The survey asks lawyers to evaluate presiding judges with whom the lawyers have personal knowledge. Id. The survey is conducted each election year. Id.
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cided to not file for reelection, and those judges who did file for reelection were more likely to face opposition than judges with good
ratings.2 9 7
Unfortunately in Texas, because similar information concerning
state judges is scattered and most often simply unavailable, and because our judicial elections have become so politicized, voters often
vote on straight party lines without knowing the candidate for whom
they are voting.2 98 A simple survey could be sent via e-mail to state
attorneys who provide e-mail addresses with the bar similar to the way
that Texas attorneys vote for President of the Texas Bar Association.2 99 It is an efficient eco-friendly manner of conducting business;
however, a back-up plan for those attorneys who do not have e-mail
access or choose to participate by mail could be used. This state bar
election system is an already existing platform that could easily be
used for judicial surveys with little modification.
VII.

BEYOND JUDICIAL SURVEYS: THE NEED FOR SUMMARIES

AND TRANSPARENCY OF DECISIONS AND JUDGES' RECORDS

INCLUDING SURVEYS BY PRIOR LITIGANTS AND JURORS

Some basic data about judges' decisions should also be made available to the public. Given the "mistrust" of attorneys in general, which
popular television shows and the media promulgate, voters might not
be quite as persuaded as one might hope if judicial surveys of bar
members are the only information that voters have before entering
the ballot box.3"'
On judges' records of decisions in family law cases, the following
data should be included and made available to the public: the percentage of cases from that judge's docket that are appealed; the percentage of cases affirmed on appeal; and the percentage of cases reversed
or modified on appeal.
In family law jurisprudence, the Author also recommends that clarification on the above statistical data state whether it was the managing
conservator (usually the mother) or possessory conservator (usually
the father) who filed the appeal and the disposition of the case.
Another solution that could easily be enacted is to conduct surveys
of prior litigants and jurors. This is a radical idea, but firms should use
their right to survey jurors after each verdict.3 01 If surveys were used
297. Id.
298. See Phillips, supra note 244, at 283.
299. See State Bar of Texas, 2009 State Bar and TYLA Elections, http://www.texas
bar.com/Template.cfm?Section=Meet theCandidatesl&Template=/ContentManage
ment/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=23851 (last visited Jan. 3, 2010).
300. As previously mentioned, over 100 years ago mistrust of the judiciary ran rampant prior to the 1875 Convention that resulted in our current state Constitution. See
generally Cooper, supra note 36. Today, public mistrust of the judicial process continues. See Johnson & Urbis, supra note 176, at 542.
301. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 294.
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for litigants in family courts to find out how they felt they were treated
(not the results of the case), voters could more easily relate to "real
people," rather than whom the general public mostly feels is the legal
"elite."
Of course, the surveyors will have to sort the wheat from the fray.
Because of the high emotional intensity involved in family law disputes and because litigants tend to be very verbose when discussing
their tales, some data could be skewed. However, as with all statistical
analysis, if a large enough sample is used, the margin of error would
be decreased. This program would be an interesting experiment that
could lead to important changes in how we select our judiciary and
how we better educate our voters until such time as we have an appointed judiciary.
There are two upsides to surveys of this kind. First, they can prevent the problem that "[t]oo many times the public has no idea who
their judges are or how they're doing. '"302 However, by releasing the
survey takers' comments to the public, it "helps give people a more
performance, something a numerical
complete picture of a judge's
30 3
ranking alone cannot do."
In Texas, a 1992 study, a bit out of date, but still relevant today,
revealed campaigns often cost at least one million dollars or more.3 °4
Historically, plaintiffs' trial law firms have contributed the bulk of
campaign contributions.3 °5 The reality is that Texas is such a politically divided state that in some counties judges of one political party
run unopposed because judges of another political affiliation know
they have little or no chance of being elected. In counties such as
Tarrant, Dallas, and especially Harris, the overwhelming majorities of
judges are listed on the ballot as Republican and most trial lawyers
are registered Democrats, or at least vote Democrat in local
elections.3 °6
A recent article in The New York Times addressed the fact that the
problem of campaign contribution pressures and re-election have not
only continued, but have been exacerbated. 30 7 The article focuses on
a judge elected in Wisconsin in April 2008 on a "vote [that] came after
a bitter $5 million campaign in which a small-town trial judge with
thin credentials ran a television advertisement falsely suggesting that
the only black justice on the state Supreme Court had helped free a
black rapist. The challenger unseated the justice with 51 percent of
302. Lynn, supra note 278.
303. Id.
304. Anthony Champagne, Campaign Contributionsin Texas Supreme Court Races,
in JUSTICE FOR SALE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/justice/que/
studies.html#tx, originallypublished in 17 CRIME, L. & Soc. CHANGE 91 (1992).
305. Id.
306. See generally Maute, supra note 240 (discussing the problems with partisan
elections).
307. Liptak, supra note 202.
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When one factors in that "[n]ationwide, 87 percent of all

state court judges face elections, and 39 states elect at least some of
their judges, '30 9 coupled with the multi-million dollar campaigns in
Texas, it is a bit unnerving and unsettling because it shows that with
enough money, anyone could potentially run a successful and inaccurate smear campaign targeting voters and specific interest groups affiliated with particular parties.
"In the rest of the world, the usual selection methods [of judges]
emphasize technical skill and insulate judges from popular will, tilting
in the direction of independence. '310 In the rest of the world, judges
are most commonly appointed by the executive branch, similar to the
manner in which federal judges in the United States are chosen. 311
Even Sandra Day O'Connor has "condemned the practice of electing
'
judges."312
She has stated on record that "[n]o other nation in the
world does that ... because [these other nations] realize you're not
going to get fair and impartial judges that way. '3 13 However, an appointment system or appointment with evaluations to determine retention is not a panacea for our state's judicial system. In fact, others
agree. One critic, Professor David M. O'Brien at the University of
Virginia, has commented that "[t]he selection of appointed judges...
can be influenced by political consideration and cronyism that are hid3 14
den from public view.
A further consideration is the quantity versus the quality of opinions written by judges. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, and Eric A.
Posner 3 5 wrote a working paper at the University of Chicago Law
School in 2004 "[t]hat found that elected judges wrote more opinions
while appointed judges wrote opinions of higher quality."3 6 Their
findings were based on the notion that elected judges are perhaps
more winners of a popularity
contest with the general voting public
317
than appointed judges.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. Hans A. Linde, a justice of the Oregon Supreme Court, who has since
retired and is cited in the article, has stated that the United States's adherence to
judicial elections "is as incomprehensible as [the United States's] rejection of the metric system." Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Eric A. Posner is a law professor at the University of Chicago and is also the
son of Richard A. Posner, a prominent appellate judge on the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals.
316. Liptak, supra note 202.
317. "A simple explanation for our results ... is that electoral judgeships attract
and reward politically savvy people, while appointed judgeships attract more professionally able people. However, the politically savvy people might give the public what
it wants-adequate rather than great opinions, in greater quantity." Id.
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The public is to blame just as equally as partisan politics and the
legislature for the current state of judicial affairs. Citizens have the
right to vote,3 18 and with that right comes the duty to become as educated a voter as possible. Steven E. Schier, a professor of political
science at Carleton College in Minnesota has stated that "[w]hen you
vote with no information, you get the illusion of control. The overwhelming norm is little or no information."3 1' 9 Further, voters need to
actually show up at the polls on election day. With absentee ballots,
early voting, and motor voting, there really is no excuse not to vote.
In addition, the public does not understand what exactly it is that
judges and attorneys do. For example, jurors are often confused when
they see opposing counsel smile and say polite greetings in the hallway
outside the courtroom. Behavior like this, without an explanation
that we, as members of the bar, are zealous advocates in the courtroom but have an ethical duty to act with courtesy to our fellow bar
members, leads some jurors, and a significant percentage of the public
at large, to think that the legal profession works something like the
mob-that it is organized, arranged, or fixed.32 ° Three authors over
twenty years ago suggested that "U]urors often do not understand
what attorneys and judges do in the jury's absence., 321 For example,
jurors do not understand sidebar conferences or procedural issues
concerning motions in limine, or conferences about the qualifications
of experts, scheduling issues, and the like.3 22 Attorneys who think
that jurors do not go home at the end of a long day listening to testimony or do not talk about their experiences as a juror at some point
long after the trial is over are fooling themselves. How many individuals have had conversations with spouses, parents, neighbors, and colleagues about their jury experiences? These experiences permeate
the public's beliefs concerning the judiciary and legal profession, in
addition to mainstream media broadcast nationwide, if not worldwide.
Further in trial, it is the judge's responsibility to ensure the fairness
of voir dire proceedings and to do everything possible to eliminate the
possibility of seating a juror who has prejudices or biases.3 23 But what
if these judges themselves are prejudiced or biased?
A further concern regarding partisan election of judges involves research that found that "all judges, even the most punitive, increase
their [criminal] sentences as re-election nears. ' 324 While this study
318. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
319. Liptak, supra note 202 (emphasis added) (pointing out the stark reality that
voters have basically no information when making decisions concerning judges).
320. Id. at 508.
321. Mark P. Brewster, Mary Katheleen Kinck & John P. Palmer, An Overview of
the Texas Bar FoundationSymposium on Cost Control at the Courthouse Held September 30, 1987, Corpus Christi, Texas, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 507, 508 (1987).
322. See id. at 508-09.
323. Id. at 507-08.
324. Liptak, supra note 202.
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concerned criminal cases, one wonders if it affects family law matters
as well, including family law matters that are quasi-criminal and involve the juvenile court system.
As a practicing attorney, student of the law, professor, wife, mother,
and a current litigant in the family court system, the Author wholeheartedly believes that people eligible to vote should and must vote,
but that their decisions should be educated. The Author also believes
that serious reform (not just the lip-service candidates give during
election years concerning "reform") needs to be done to eliminate
voter "[diecisions based on ad[vertisements] filled with lies, decep'
tion, falsehood and race baiting."325
VII.

IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE REFORM OUR
STATE JUDICIARY

Now

Given the current failed state of our judiciary, the stakes have never
been higher for reformation of how we choose, and more importantly
retain our state judges at all levels. Further, the understanding of how
Texas has evolved from appointed judges to a purely electoral system
provides priceless hindsight into our framers' true intent and, more
importantly, their fears. Unlike the executive and legislative branch
that deals with individuals as a collective body, the judicial branch
deals with individuals on an individual, personal basis. As General
Lawrence Sullivan (Sul) Ross 326 prophetically stated on the fiftyeighth day of the debates on November 11, 1875:
The judiciary deals with the person and property of the individual
members of society, while the other departments deal only with the
general body politic. Wrongs done by the latter attract universal
public attention, demand and receive speedy redress, while those
done by the former fall upon the individual citizen, impose upon or
crush him and he is without remedy, because the unjust judgment is
law to him and his case. So that, in the ability, integrity, and learning of the judge, each individual citizen finds his most powerful, and
frequently his only, assurance of protection for his person and
property.
Unjust and oppressive laws may be repealed, but unjust and oppressive judgments, rendered in the lower, and affirmed in the higher,
courts are irrepealable [sic] and fixed, and the luckless citizen is
wronged without remedy and his wrongs do not even attract atten325. Id.
326. General Sul Ross, in addition to being a delegate to the 1875 Convention was
also a President of Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College (now Texas A&M University). SUL Ross STATE UNIV., A HISTORY OF SUL Ross http://www.sulross.edu/
pages/3718.asp.
327. DEBATES IN THE TEXAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, supra note
163, at 428.
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tion beyond his immediate neighborhood.32 8 Uniformity in the decisions of the courts, so essential to the well being of the people can
be secured only by obtaining and by keeping in office good judges.
Rotation in political office is a wise rule, but when we get a good
judge in judicial office, we should desire to keep him as long as he is
able to do efficient work.329

Now is the time to unite together to enact fundamental change to
the state's judiciary. Voters need to hold legislators accountable and
refuse to allow them to continue to pass the buck and work together
in a bicameral manner to pass real judicial reform. It is not an excuse
for the house to blame the senate or for the senate to blame the house
or that time simply ran out before a real reform bill can be passed. It
is also not an excuse that our legislature only meets every two years.
Voters need to stand up and demand that our legislature enact fundamental change to the way we select our state judges and make our
representatives in the senate and house very aware that we are watching and will vote accordingly. In a state where recent legislation concerning same-sex marriage was fast tracked through the legislative
process,33 ° it boggles the mind how for over sixty years nothing has
come to fruition concerning a real reform of our state's judiciary-a
judiciary that affects all lives, especially the lives of children who cannot speak for themselves. Voters must send a strong message to their
representatives in Austin that enough is enough. The stakes have
never been higher.
The Author would prefer a system of appointed state judges at all
levels who are retained on a merit-based system and are subject to
removal by two-thirds of the senate, similar to what Texas had (after
becoming sovereign from Mexico) in 1836 for county and justice of
the peace courts; in 1845 for district and supreme court judges; 1861
for judges at all levels; and 1869 for judges at all levels. The reality is
that "[n]o one can guarantee another's honesty in any walk of life, and
the mere adoption of an appointive system would not accomplish that
goal. ' 331 However, with an appointment system and retention that is
merit-based and subject to two-thirds removal by the senate, there will
be many beneficial results.
328. Id. These words dealt with more criminal law issues and writs of habeas
corpus, but law is law, and the Author finds these words speak volumes. A popular
quote that gets bounced around among parents and educators is: "To the world you
may be one person, but to one person you may be the world." The author of this
quote, like the individuals that General Ross speaks of, were individuals who most
likely were virtually unknown, except their lawsuit meant the world to them. The
Author knows all too well how a lifetime can change in the blink of an eye or with a
signature on a line-the lifetime of one of our precious Texas children.
329. DEBATES IN THE TEXAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, supra note
163, at 428.
330. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204 (Vernon 2006).
331. Johnson & Urbis, supra note 176, at 565.
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First, this will provide gatekeepers an oversight mechanism that will
diminish bias in our judiciary. Second, appointed judges will not have
to waste time away from the bench soliciting campaign contributions
or running print and televised advertisements. Appointed judges are
free of these entanglements that elected judges face every election
year. Third, the best and the brightest will be selected to sit on our
state benches, including benches that decide the fates of our children.
An appointment system, while not perfect, will help alleviate at
least some of the "internal factors resulting from a judge's personal
experience '332 that may come into play and color a decision with either intentional or unintentional bias. 333 "Personal biases emanating
from particular circumstances are bound to impact a judge's thinking ' 334 because "[e]ach judge, after all, is herself the product of a family, and, presumably,
she relates to many of the issues that bring
3 35
families to court.
Transforming the state's judiciary with a merit-based system that
eliminates partisan elections as well as reforms the state Family Code
to provide for recusal in the event of bias are two great steps toward
reforming our antiquated judicial system and in particular our family
courts. The stakes have never been higher. The future of our children
and grandchildren depends on us to step up, be better voters, be better citizens, and finally say that there is no longer an excuse for our
legislature to fail to launch a bill for our state's governor to review.
The time is not only now to remedy the inadequacies of the outdated
Constitution, but yesterday and the hundreds of yesterdays before it.
We have failed to launch and actually land, feet forward, ready and
prepared to embark on the next 132 years-years that have the potential to be Texas's finest years yet if Texans grasp the opportunity now
and have a successful landing of the launches started by others before
US.
332. Moran, supra note 206, at 364. "The presumption is that when a judge is appointed, she will be freer to make decisions notwithstanding political forces." Id.
333. The Author bases her statements about the very real circumstances of judicial
bias in the family law context not only based on her practice in family courts, but also
based on her own personal experience as a litigant in family court. The Author does
not think, and is not trying to convey that all family court judges are biased; however,
the Author has witnessed first-hand bias in favor of attorneys or against attorneys and
bias in favor of litigants or against other litigants on more than one occasion. The
Author has also worked with several very kind and compassionate family law judges
who gave her great assistance when she was first getting started as an attorney out of
law school and was not quite certain how to proceed in a particular matter.
334. Moran, supra note 206, at 364.
335. Id. However, even with an appointed judiciary, "[nlo one can guarantee another's honesty in any walk of life, and the mere adoption of an appointive system
would not accomplish that goal." Johnson & Urbis, supra note 176, at 537-38, 565.
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